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Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet 
Stacey L. Dogan* & Mark A. Lemley**+ 
 
In theory, trademarks serve as information tools, by conveying product 
information through convenient, identifiable symbols.  In practice, 
however, trademarks have increasingly been used to obstruct the flow 
of information about competing products and services.  In the online 
context, in particular, some courts have recently allowed trademark 
holders to block uses of their marks that would never have raised an 
eyebrow in a brick-and-mortar setting – uses that increase, rather 
than diminish, the flow of truthful, relevant information to consumers.  
These courts have stretched trademark doctrine on more than one 
dimension, both by expanding the concept of actionable “confusion” 
and by broadening the classes of people who can face legal 
responsibility for that confusion.  And they have based their decisions 
not on the normative goals of trademark law, but on unexplored 
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instincts and tenuous presumptions about consumer expectations and 
practices on the Internet.  We argue that this expansionist trend in 
Internet trademark cases threatens to undermine a central goal of the 
Lanham Act – to promote fair and robust competition through 




 Trademark law, in theory, fosters the flow of information in markets.  By 
protecting against deceptive uses of trade symbols in commerce, the law enables sellers 
to create their own reliable shorthand to identify their goods, and reduces search costs for 
consumers.1  Trademarks thus have the potential to lead to better-informed customers and 
more competitive markets.  In practice, however, overreaching trademark law can have 
exactly the opposite effect.  If trademark holders were allowed, say, to prevent the use of 
their marks to critique the trademark holders’ products or compare them to others, 
trademarks would become tools for suppressing information that is critical to a 
functioning market.  To avoid this result, courts and Congress have historically insisted 
on clear substantive rules in trademark cases.  Many trademark rules – the requirement 
that a defendant use a mark in connection with goods or services to infringe,2 the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Law School for discussions and comments on earlier drafts. 
1   See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (“The 
fundamental purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs by providing a 
concise and unequivocal identifier of a particular source of goods.”). 
2  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a) (limiting causes of action for trademark 
infringement to uses “in connection with” the sale or offering of goods or services “in 
commerce”); DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2003) (use of 
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insistence on likelihood of confusion,3 and the exemption for truthful comparative 
advertising4 – arose in part from attempts to make trademark law serve, rather than 
impede, the free flow of non-deceptive information.5   
 A recent series of Internet-related trademark cases has seriously eroded these 
substantive requirements, to the point at which trademark law’s anticompetitive 
tendencies threaten to overwhelm its information-facilitating function in some contexts.  
The expansions have occurred on two axes.  First, a number of courts have broadened the 
class of people who can face legal responsibility for trademark infringement.  
Historically, to face liability under trademark law, a party had to “use” a mark as a brand 
in connection with the offering of goods and services, typically in competition with the 
trademark holder.6  A party could face contributory liability for another’s infringing use 
of a mark only in the rare case when it “intentionally induce[d] another to infringe a 
trademark,” or “continue[d] to supply its product to one whom it kn[ew] or ha[d] reason 
                                                                                                                                                 
telephone number that translated into 1-800-MERCEDES did not constitute “use” of the 
mark for purposes of the Lanham Act, when defendant “only licensed the phone number 
but did not advertise or promote Mercedes’ protected marks”); L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake 
Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting state anti-dilution claim against 
publisher that produced a parody of an L.L. Bean ad, because the publisher “did not use 
Bean’s mark to identify or market goods or services to consumers”).  See generally infra 
__. 
3 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a); see infra notes __-__ and accompanying text.  
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968); see 
also infra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
5 See also Societe Comptoir de L’Industrie Cotonniere Establissements Boussac v. 
Alexander’s Department Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 1962) (allowing party that 
legally copied Christian Dior design to describe its products as Dior copies:  “The interest 
of the consumer here in competitive prices of garments using Dior designs without 
deception as to origin, is at least as great as the interest of the plaintiffs in monopolizing 
the name.”). 
6 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125; see also infra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
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to know [wa]s engaging in trademark infringement….”7  But a handful of courts have 
lately dispensed with these limiting rules and endorsed liability against parties that 
neither used the trademark as a brand for their own products, nor satisfied the rigorous 
standard for contributory liability.  In particular, two recent decisions held that Internet 
intermediaries could face liability for using trademarks to help advertisers identify 
consumers interested in the trademark holder’s products.  These decisions – Playboy 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp.8 and 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. 
WhenU.com9 – either created a new, broader species of contributory trademark 
infringement, or applied the doctrine of direct infringement by broadening the meaning of 
trademark “use” to include parties that did not even arguably offer their own products or 
services under the mark.  Either way, these courts broke new and troubling ground. 
 Compounding the effects of this first expansion, courts have increasingly shifted 
the focus of infringement analysis away from consumer confusion and toward a more 
generalized inquiry into whether a challenged use diverts attention away from the 
trademark holder.  “Initial interest confusion,” which historically referred to a form of 
                                                 
7 Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854-55 (1982); see also Sony 
Corp. of Amer. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 & n.19 (1984) 
(describing Inwood Labs test to require intentional inducement or the supply of products 
“to identified individuals known by [the defendant] to be engaging in continuing 
infringement” of the trademark holder’s rights). 
8 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that Internet search engine could face liability 
for allowing advertisers to use trademarks as “keywords” that, if entered by Internet 
users, would generate ads not authorized by the trademark holder). 
9  309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that firm generating pop-up 
advertisements, as well as its advertisers, could face liability for trademark infringement 
based on their “use” of trademarked terms to generate the ads).  Compare U-Haul Int’l v. 
WhenU.com, 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding that selling a pop-up 
advertisement based on a trademarked keyword was not trademark use and was therefore 
not infringing); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 
2003) (same). 
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consumer confusion that occurred before the point of sale, has morphed into a standalone 
doctrine whose criteria bear little relationship to a traditional likelihood of confusion 
claim.  Some courts have used the initial interest confusion doctrine to justify claims 
against virtually any use that temporarily diverts customers to a website not authorized by 
the trademark holder, without regard to whether the diversion resulted from confusion or 
harmed consumer interests in any way.10  The courts’ adoption of the “initial interest 
confusion” doctrine as a replacement for proof of likelihood of confusion, along with a 
related conclusion that consumer frustration can cause dilution of a famous mark,11 has 
allowed trademark holders to enjoin competitors from using marks in metatags, domain 
names, or other contexts that might conceivably result in a consumer mistakenly reaching 
a website not authorized by the trademark holder.12  Whether one agrees with the 
outcome of these decisions or not, they undoubtedly chart new territory in trademark law 
and expand the kinds of trademark usage that can subject a defendant to an infringement 
claim.  And while the initial interest confusion doctrine at first reached only competitors 
who were clearly attempting to confuse consumers into reaching the wrong sites,13 over 
                                                 
10 See Brookfield Communs., Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 
1062 (9th Cir. 1999) (allowing cause of action when, “although there is no source 
confusion in the sense that consumers know they are patronizing West Coast rather than 
Brookfield, there is nevertheless initial interest confusion in the sense that, by using 
‘moviebuff.com’ or ‘MovieBuff’ to divert people looking for ‘MovieBuff’ to its web site, 
West Coast improperly benefits from the goodwill that Brookfield developed in its 
mark.”). 
11 See Panavision Intern’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1327 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that registration of a famous mark as a domain name causes dilution because 
“potential customers … will be discouraged if they cannot find [the trademark holder’s] 
web page” by typing MARK.com).   
12 See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
13  See Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. Check Point Software Technologies, Inc., 269 F.3d 
270 (3d Cir. 2001) (initial interest confusion requires proof that parties are direct 
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time, the doctrine has been invoked to prevent non-competitive uses as well as uses that 
appeared more likely to enlighten than to confuse.14 
We argue that, cumulatively, these two axes of trademark expansion pose a grave 
danger to the law’s information-facilitating goals. The extension of trademark law to 
search engines, directories, and other parties that use marks as classification tools poses a 
grave threat to speech and to the dissemination of truthful information.  By suggesting 
that Internet intermediaries have a responsibility to police the content of their advertisers 
and cannot use marks as keywords to identify logically related products, Playboy v. 
Netscape and its ilk threaten to chill a vast sector of informative speech, particularly (but 
not solely) in the Internet context. This chilling effect occurs both directly – by restricting 
the dissemination of truthful comparative advertising – and indirectly – by eliminating 
the primary source of revenue that has supported the development of sophisticated and 
accurate search engine technology.   
The chilling effect grows particularly acute as confusion and deception become 
less central to trademark infringement claims.  Even if intermediaries faced liability only 
                                                                                                                                                 
competitors).  Indeed, courts acknowledged that even competitors might sometimes have 
a legitimate reason to use the trademark on their sites and related descriptors.  See, e.g., 
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 802-04 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that use of 
trademarks in website’s metatags is appropriate when the site refers to trademark in 
nominative way, and the metatags accurately reflect the content of the site). 
14 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th 
Cir. 2004); Promatec Industries, Inc. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002).  
Even as initially articulated, the Ninth Circuit described initial interest confusion broadly 
enough to encompass attention-grabbing efforts:  “Initial interest confusion occurs when 
the defendant uses the plaintiff’s trademark ‘in a manner calculated to capture initial 
consumer attention, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the 
confusion.’”  Brookfield Communs., Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 
1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999).  Cf. AM Gen’l Corp. v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796 
(7th Cir. 2002) (limiting initial interest confusion to “bait and switch” tactics, in which the 
competitor’s use of the mark “permits [it] to ‘get its foot in the door’ by confusing the 
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for blatantly deceptive uses of trademarks by their advertisers, the costs of policing all of 
their advertisers’ copy for such content would be prohibitive and unprecedented.  But as 
trademark law increasingly condemns behavior that diverts attention but does not 
necessarily deceive, search engines have no practicable means of distinguishing between 
legitimate and unlawful uses of marks.  They can avoid liability in such a system only by 
requiring trademark holders’ authorization for every single use of their marks – in 
branding, as classification, or otherwise.  This expansive approach to trademark law – 
which arguably follows from recent interpretations of the initial interest confusion 
doctrine – conflicts with the longstanding rule in favor of comparative advertising and the 
normative goal of producing better-informed consumers.  Ironically, under this restrictive 
legal approach the challenge of lowering barriers to entry in markets dominated by a 
single brand could well prove harder in the age of the Internet than in an era in which 
vendors could simply place like products beside one another on store shelves. 
Each of the decisions that have distended trademark law in these ways rested at 
least partly on an instinct that the law should prevent parties from profiting from the use 
of another party’s mark.15  In analyzing Netscape’s good faith in the Playboy case, for 
example, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that Netscape had profited when its advertisers 
                                                                                                                                                 
customers”). 
15   The 1-800 Contacts decision may also have rested on a felt sense that pop-up ads are 
a nuisance akin to spam.  See Kristen M. Beystehner, See Ya Later, Gator: Assessing 
whether Placing Pop-Up Advertisements on Another Company’s Website Violates 
Trademark Law, 11 J. Intell. Prop. L. 87, 87 (2003) (criticizing pop-ups as “guerilla 
marketing tactics” and arguing they should be illegal).  But see Peter Randall, Will 
Copyright Eat Gator?  The Conflict Between Copyright, the Computer Desktop, and 
Customization of the Internet Experience, 2003 U. Ill. J. L., Tech. & Pol’y 259 
(defending pop-up ads as an instance of user customization). 
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used Playboy’s trademarks to call attention to their competing products.16  The court’s 
overall analysis implied that there was something unsavory about benefiting financially 
from the goodwill of an established trademark.  But “unfair competition” is not 
redundant.17  This unjust enrichment instinct runs counter to the core values of trademark 
law, which make the value of fair competition paramount.18  If carried to its logical 
extreme, this instinct would argue in favor of a property right in gross for trademark 
holders – something the courts have vigorously resisted in the past.19 
Admittedly, the courts have no easy task in deciding whether certain behavior on 
the Internet is likely to confuse consumers.  Search technologies, as well as consumer 
                                                 
16 See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 
2004) (noting that search engines profit from click-through ads that result from 
confusion); see also Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 
F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding claim against competitor who used trademark in 
metatags, because “even though there is no source confusion in the sense that consumers 
know [who] they are patronizing, … there is nevertheless initial interest confusion in the 
sense that, by using ‘moviebuff.com’ or ‘MovieBuff’ to divert people looking for 
‘MovieBuff’ to its website, [the defendant] improperly benefits from the goodwill that 
[the plaintiff] developed in its mark”). 
17  See Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1445 (3d Cir. 
1994) (distinguishing between “robust competition” and “unfair competition”). 
18   William Kratzke has made this point effectively, deconstructing the unjust enrichment 
or “free riding” rhetoric of trademark cases, which as he points out are conclusionary 
epithets rather than workable economic principles.  See William P. Kratzke, Normative 
Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 199, 223 (1991).  For 
a more general criticism of the rhetoric of free riding in intellectual property law, see 
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding (working paper 2004). 
19   See, e.g., Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of 
Travel Development, 170 F.3d 449, 456 (4th Cir. 1999) (rejecting “radical” dilution 
theories that would create property rights in gross in trademarks); Ralph S. Brown Jr., 
Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 Yale L.J. 
1165, 1184 (1948); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common 
Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1714 (1999); Kenneth L. Port, Trademark Monopolies in the 
Blue Nowhere, 28 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1091 (2002); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark 
Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367 (1999); Frank Schechter, Fog and Fiction in Trade-mark 
Protection, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 60, 65 (1936) (concluding that calling trademarks property 
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practices and expectations, are constantly evolving in a way that makes it impossible to 
assess the existence and the costs of consumer confusion.20  But courts in these cases 
must keep in mind that they are more than enforcers of existing norms – they are norms 
creators, in the sense that the rules they develop will determine practices on the Web and 
whether the Internet realizes its potential as a vast clearinghouse of information and 
content.21  If the courts create norms in which search engines must avoid “using” 
trademarks in any way that might bring financial benefit to the trademark holder’s 
competitor, to some non-competing business, or to themselves, then they will have 
disserved the objectives of the Lanham Act by turning trademarks into vehicles for 
suppressing information.   
Part I describes the relationship between trademarks and information.  It begins 
with the economic defense of trademarks as tools for reducing consumer search costs, 
and describes a number of doctrines in trademark law designed to promote, rather than 
impede, the free flow of product information.  While the view of trademark enforcement 
as reducing consumer search costs is well-known in the economic literature, we extend 
that work by showing how many of the limitations and defenses in trademark doctrine 
also serve that goal. 
Part II explores the recent distortions of trademark doctrine along the axes 
described above.  It concludes that these extensions of trademark law collide with both 
longstanding trademark doctrine and the normative goals of trademark law, and discusses 
                                                                                                                                                 
doesn’t help in understanding their proper scope). 
20   See Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law (working 
paper 2004) (making this point). 
21   See Graeme Dinwoodie’s paper in this symposium (discussing the proactive vs. 
reactive nature of trademark law). 
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the implications of this result for the availability of information in the marketplace.  
Beginning with the trend toward liability against parties who have not themselves “used” 
trademarks in the traditional branding sense, we contend that these cases will inevitably 
chill the behavior of publishers, search engines, and other intermediaries whose 
information-facilitating services implicate the use of all kinds of words, including 
trademarks.  This chilling effect is only compounded by the indeterminacy of trademark 
analysis in an “initial interest confusion” era.  The absence of normative guidelines in 
initial interest confusion cases, together with the courts’ increased reliance on an unjust 
enrichment rationale, at best make it tricky to predict whether a court would condone or 
condemn a particular use of a trademark on the Internet.  At worst, these developments 
suggest that parties now risk liability by using trademarks in truthful, information-
enhancing ways.  The combined effect of these developments could well be to make 
consumer search more difficult on the Internet than in the offline context. 
We offer two modest suggestions to reverse these trends and reinstate trademark 
law as an information facilitator.  First, liability under the trademark and unfair 
competition laws should apply only against parties who use trademarks or misleading 
advertisements to sell their own products, or those acting closely in concert with them.  
To extend liability beyond this tight circle would defeat the Lanham Act’s objective of 
facilitating truthful information to ensure efficient, competitive markets.  Second, courts 
should resist the temptation to turn “initial interest confusion” into an alternative theory 
of trademark liability, rather than an occasionally useful lens for assessing traditional 
infringement and unfair competition claims.  The difference is not merely semantic; by 
reorienting trademark analysis toward the capturing of “initial interest” rather than on the 
Internet Search Costs – Dogan & Lemley  DRAFT 
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likelihood that consumers will actually be confused, some courts have ventured away 
from the core factual inquiries that determine whether a particular use of a trademark will 
distort the information marketplace.  While initial interest confusion can certainly distort 
the marketplace and increase consumer search costs, evaluation of both the existence and 
the costs of such confusion requires the rigorous, fact-specific analysis that trademark 
infringement and unfair competition law have historically involved. 
Part III closes with some general observations about the role of normative goals in 
trademark rulemaking.  None of the changes that we advocate in this article require new 
law, but simply a reinstatement of longstanding legal standards in trademark cases.  
Indeed, while we criticize some courts for ignoring these guiding principles, other courts 
are getting it right, applying the doctrine of trademark use in the online environment.  
Because the courts in the cases we criticize appear willing to stretch or ignore doctrine 
because of their equitable concerns about unjust enrichment, the solution lies, in part, in 
reminding them of the equities on the other side – the reasons we have limiting doctrines 
in trademark law and the importance of applying them uniformly. 
 
I. Trademarks and Information 
A. Economic Theory – Trademarks and Search Costs 
Most people think of trademark law in terms of what it forbids:  the use of another 
party’s trademark, or something resembling it, in a way that will cause confusion among 
consumers in the marketplace.  Courts commonly describe the goal of trademark law as 
avoiding consumer confusion, which has the corollary effect of preventing the 
appropriation of a producer’s good will.  Both consumers and producers, these courts 
Internet Search Costs – Dogan & Lemley  DRAFT 
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point out, benefit from having access to truthful information about the source of products 
and services. 
In economic terms, trademarks contribute to economic efficiency by reducing 
consumer search costs.22  Rather than having to inquire into the provenance and qualities 
of every potential purchase, consumers can look to trademarks as shorthand indicators.  
With information less expensive, consumers will demand more of it, and will arguably 
become better informed, resulting in a more competitive market.23  This system works, of 
                                                 
22 See William Landes & Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual 
Property Law 167 (2003); William Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law:  An 
Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. & Econ. 265, 268-70 (1987); Mark A. Lemley, The 
Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 Yale L.J. 1687, 1690-93 
(1999) (describing economic justifications for trademarks and advertising); John F. 
Coverdale, Trademarks and Generic Words: An Effect-on-Competition Test, 51 Univ. 
Chi. L. Rev. 868 (1984); Nicholas Economides, Trademarks, in The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and the Law 601 (1998); Nicholas Economides, The Economics 
of Trademarks, 78 Trademark Rep. 523 (1988); I.P.L. Png & David Reitman, Why Are 
Some Products Branded and Others Not?, 38 J. L. & Econ. 207 (1995) (documenting 
search costs rationale empirically); see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co., 514 
U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (trademark law “reduce[s] the customer’s cost of shopping and 
making purchasing decisions,” and “helps assure a producer that it (and not an imitating 
competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated with a desirable 
product”); United National Bank of Texas, Laredo, Tex., v. Union Nat. Bank of Texas, 
Austin, Tex., 909 F.2d 839, 844 (5th Cir. 1990) (“The idea is that trademarks are 
‘distinguishing’ features which lower consumer search costs and encourage higher 
quality production by discouraging free-riders.”); cf. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. 
Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (“A trademark is a merchandising 
short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to 
believe he wants.”). 
23  See Hal R. Varian, Microeconomic Analysis 82 (2d ed. 1984) (describing perfect 
information as one of the characteristics of a competitive market).  To some extent, the 
brand-based product differentiation encouraged by trademark law arguably runs in 
tension with the law’s information-facilitating goals.  Ralph Brown famously argued that 
strong trademark protection has the effect of misallocating resources toward advertising, 
“most [of which] is designed not to inform, but to persuade and influence.”  Ralph S. 
Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest:  Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 
Yale L.J. 1165, 1169 (1948); see id. (“Considering the economic welfare of the 
community as a whole, to use up part of the national product persuading people to buy 
product A rather than product B appears to be a waste of resources.”).  Yet trademarks 
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course, only if consumers can trust the accuracy of trademarks, and this is where the law 
comes in.24  By protecting established trademarks against confusing imitation, the law 
ensures a reliable vocabulary for communications between producers and consumers.  
Both sellers and buyers benefit from the ability to trust this vocabulary to mean what it 
says it means.  Sellers benefit because they can invest in goodwill with the knowledge 
that others will not appropriate it.25  Consumers benefit because they don’t have to do 
exhaustive research or even to spend extra time looking at labels before making a 
purchase; they can know, based on a brand name, that a product has the features that they 
are seeking.26  Trademark law, in other words, aims to promote rigorous, truthful 
competition in the marketplace by preserving the clarity of the language of trade.27 
                                                                                                                                                 
undeniably provide value in conveying information about products and sources.  Thus, 
“the only sensible conclusion, and the one eventually reached, was that trademark 
protection can both serve and disserve the development of an efficient and desirably 
competitive market.”  Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367, 
370 (1999).  The key was to craft rules that minimized trademarks’ anticompetitive 
effects. 
24 See Landes & Posner, supra note 22, at 270 (“If the law does not prevent it, free riding 
will eventually destroy the information capital embodied in a trademark, and the prospect 
of free riding may therefore eliminate the incentive to develop a valuable trademark in 
the first place.”). 
25 By preserving the integrity of brands and advertising, trademark protection has a 
corollary effect of creating incentives to maintain high quality products.  See Robert G. 
Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, __ Va. L. Rev. __ (2004) (draft at 11-
12) (“without the ability to distinguish one brand from another, there would be no reason 
for firms to create brands with more costly but higher quality characteristics”).   
26 See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968) (“Preservation of the 
trademark as a means of identifying the trademark owner’s products … makes effective 
competition possible in a complex, impersonal marketplace by providing a means 
through which the consumer can identify products that please him and reward the 
producer with continued patronage.  Without some method of product identification, 
informed consumer choice, and hence meaningful competition in quality, could not 
exist.”). 
27 See, e.g., Nicholas Economides, Trademarks, in The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Economics and the Law 601, 602-03 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (arguing that trademarks 
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Overly restrictive trademark law has the potential to stifle competition, rather than 
facilitating it.  Particularly when trademark holders have economic power, giving them 
absolute control over uses of their marks could erect significant barriers to entry by 
competitors seeking to describe their own products.28  Even in less differentiated markets, 
strong trademark rights come at a cost because they have the potential to remove words 
from our language and product features from competition.29  One task of trademark law, 
then, is to preserve the informative role of trademarks while minimizing these downside 
risks.   
 
B. Some Limiting Rules of Trademark Law, and Their Search Costs 
Rationale 
The pro-information, pro-competition goal of trademark law has several important 
implications for the scope of trademark protection, particularly in comparison to other 
areas of intellectual property law.  First and most generally, trademarks are not in gross 
property rights, but limited entitlements to protect against uses that diminish the 
                                                                                                                                                 
“facilitate and enhance consumer decisions”); William P. Kratzke, Normative Economic 
Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 199, 214-17 (1991) (arguing 
that trademarks are highly efficient means of conveying product information); Phillip 
Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. Pol. Econ. 729, 752 (1974) (arguing that the 
simple fact that a product is advertised conveys information about the “experience 
qualities” of that product); Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. 
Pol. Econ. 311, 323-25 (1970) (comparing the advantages of national versus retail 
advertising); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213, 220-
24 (1961) (arguing that, although imperfect, advertising is a valuable means to reduce 
consumer ignorance).  
28   See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 369 (1999). 
29 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the 
Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397 (1990). 
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informative value of marks.30  Trademark law thus historically limited itself to preventing 
uses of marks that “defraud[ed] the public”31 by confusing people into believing that an 
infringer’s goods were produced or sponsored by the trademark holder.32  Likelihood of 
confusion does not necessarily follow every time a party adopts another’s trademark; it 
turns on a complex analysis that considers competitive proximity, consumer 
                                                 
30 See Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1984) (invoking the rule against in gross 
assignments of trademarks:  “A trade name or mark is merely a symbol of goodwill; it 
has no independent significance apart from the goodwill it symbolizes.”); Beanstalk 
Group, Inc. v. AM General Corp., 283 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2002) (“a trademark is an 
identifier, not a freestanding piece of intellectual property; hence the rule that a trademark 
cannot be sold in gross, that is, without the assets that create the product that it 
identifies”); see generally ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub., Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).  
Landes & Posner explain that the rule against the transfer of trademarks in gross is 
important to prevent consumer deception during a “last-period” game, in which the 
company is going out of business and wishes to spend its goodwill; the long-term effect 
of permitting confusion of consumers in this way would be to increase aggregate search 
costs.  See Landes & Posner, supra note __, at 186; see also Stephen L. Carter, The 
Trouble With Trademark, 99 Yale L.J. 759, 786 (1990) (arguing that the prohibition on 
assignments in gross is consistent with trademark theory properly understood); Kratzke, 
supra note __, at 247-49 (offering an economic rationale for the rule).  Cf. Lemley, supra 
note 24 (criticizing trends in trademark law that permit transfers in gross).  But see 
Allison Sell McDade, Note, Trading in Trademarks – Why the Anti-Assignment in Gross 
Doctrine Should Be Abolished When Trademarks Are Used As Collateral, 77 Tex. L. 
Rev. 465 (1998). 
31 Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742, 744 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844). 
32 The most significant exception to this rule may be the merchandising cases, in which 
some courts have allowed trademark holders to prevent use of their marks as products, 
rather than as indicators of the brand or source of products.  See, e.g., Boston Athletic 
Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 35 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding infringement in unauthorized 
sale of “Boston Marathon” t-shirts, reasoning that “when a manufacturer intentionally 
uses another’s mark as a means of establishing a link in consumers’ minds with the 
other’s enterprise, and directly profits from that link, there is an unmistakable aura of 
deception”); Boston Professional  Hockey Ass’n, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 
Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The confusion or deceit requirement [of the 
Lanham Act] is met by the fact that the defendant duplicated the protected trademarks 
and sold them to the public knowing that the public would identify them as being the 
team’s trademarks.  The certain knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of the 
trademark symbols were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirements of the act.”).  See Lemley, 
supra note __, at 706-09 (criticizing merchandising cases). 
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sophistication, and other factors that explore whether consumers will truly presume a 
false association and thus taint the information marketplace.33  And while Congress 
recently added a federal cause of action based on the “dilution” of famous trademarks,34 
the statute is expressly designed to focus on cases in which consumer search costs are 
increased by “blurring” the significance of a unique mark35 or giving it a negative 
association, and to permit uses such as commentary and comparative advertising that 
actually facilitate consumer search.36  The Supreme Court has further limited the dilution 
law by interpreting it to require actual harm to a mark’s selling power – i.e., actual injury 
to the source-identifying function of a famous trademark.37  Like the more traditional 
                                                 
33  See Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) 
(establishing likelihood of confusion factors in Second Circuit); see also AMF, Inc. v. 
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979). 
34 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (providing federal cause of action for trademark dilution); see 
infra __. 
35   Dilution of a unique mark increases consumer search costs by making consumers who 
once associated any mention of the trademark with its owner look further for context.  If 
a consumer hears the term “Exxon,” they think immediately of the oil company.  If they 
hear “National” or “United,” by contrast, they need context to understand what is being 
referred to. The risk of blurring is precisely that unique terms will over time be relegated 
to context-specific terms. 
36 Id. § 1125(c)(4) (exempting comparative commercial advertising, noncommercial use, 
and news reporting). 
37 See Victoria’s Secret, Inc. v. Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 (2003).  Whether requiring actual 
harm is in fact in the public interest is open to question, since the federal dilution statute 
generally limits remedies to prospective injunctive relief.  But the Court’s instinct that the 
law must limit the scope of dilution in some ways is undoubtedly correct.  The 
International Trademark Association has proposed legislation at this writing that would 
change the standard to likelihood of dilution, but would also make it more difficult to 
qualify for dilution protection and expand the defenses for those whose use of a mark was 
actually reducing rather than increasing search costs.  [cite legislation]. 
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likelihood of confusion analysis, therefore, dilution – at least as properly understood38 – 
thus turns on injury to the informative value of a mark.39 
Second, trademark law rewards – and provides incentives for – investment in 
goodwill, but does not provide rights to all of the economic value that derives from that 
goodwill.  Our competitive economy is based on the premise that competitors can 
generally appropriate ideas for products and services, as long as they are doing so in a 
non-deceptive way and not infringing some other exclusive right such as copyright or 
patent.40  The patent and copyright systems represent a response to the potential market 
                                                 
38   While courts seem to understand the concept of blurring the distinctiveness of a 
formerly unique mark, they occasionally have more difficulty with dilution by 
tarnishment.  In theory, tarnishment applies only where the defendant brands its own 
goods with the plaintiff’s mark, and those goods are inferior in quality or less reputable to 
the plaintiff’s unrelated goods.  See L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, 811 F.2d 26 (1st 
Cir. 1987) (defining tarnishment).  For example, if a defendant sells Toyota brand 
pornography, those who encounter the use may think less highly of the Toyota brand 
name because they subconsciously associate it with pornography, even if they understand 
that the car company did not itself sponsor the materials. 
Courts applying the tarnishment doctrine have sometimes used it to target 
criticism or derogatory speech about the trademark owner, a result that finds little 
justification in the search cost rationale.  See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 
39 (2d Cir. 1994).  Most courts, however, properly distinguish the two.  See, e.g., Mattel, 
Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003); Mastercard Int’l v. 
Nader 2000 Primary Committee, 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004). 
39 See V Secret, 537 U.S. at 433-34; see also Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to 
Evoke, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 291, 315-16 (2003) (interpreting Moseley to limit the federal 
antidilution statute to uses that reduce the “singularity” of famous marks).  
40 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) 
(“[C]opying is not always discouraged or disfavored by the laws which preserve our 
competitive economy.”); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 98 (C.D. Iowa 
1982) (“It is not only fair to imitate nonpatented functional products, it is necessary to our 
form of economy.”).  When copying unprotected product features, competitors must 
sometimes take extra steps to protect against consumer confusion, such as the prominent 
use of their own trademarks in marketing the copied product.  See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. 
National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove 
Works, 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir. 1980).  In this way, the courts protect the competitive 
marketplace while at the same time keeping search costs at a minimum.  Cf. Sears, 
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failure that can result from copying of public goods.41  By contrast, trademark law is 
avowedly not designed to resolve any perceived failure in the market for quality products 
and services.42  Thus, trademark law is reluctant to provide protection for product 
configurations, because doing so may give the trademark owner control not just over 
search characteristics but the intrinsic value of the product itself.43  Only where the 
product configuration has an established meaning in the minds of consumers is it entitled 
to protection.44 
Trademark law’s pro-competitive objectives sometimes require limitations on 
trademark holders’ rights, even when competitors might appear to receive a windfall as a 
result.45  The Supreme Court recently emphasized, for example, that even if the public 
associates a particular feature with its first producer, the Lanham Act does not prevent 
                                                                                                                                                 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1964) (“Doubtless a State may, in 
appropriate circumstances, require that goods, whether patented or not, be labeled or that 
other precautionary steps be taken to prevent customers from being misled as to the 
source….  But because of the federal patent laws a State may not, when the article is 
unpatented and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages 
for such copying.”). 
41 In economic terms, a public good is both non-rivalrous and non-excludable, meaning 
that after it has been created and released, many parties can possess it simultaneously and 
the original creator cannot physically exclude others from doing so.  United States 
copyright and patent law rest on the notion that, absent some form of legal protection, 
creators will underinvest in public goods such as useful inventions, art and music.  See, 
e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in 
Intellectual Proprety, 17 U. Dayton L. Rev. 853 (1992); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as 
Market Failure:  A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its 
Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1610-11 (1982). 
42 See TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 29. 
43   See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
44   Id. 
45 See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).  
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others from copying the feature if it is part of what makes the product work.46  The law 
may require some remedy, including clear source identification, to protect against 
consumer confusion and the resulting increase in search costs, but it does not allow 
exclusive rights to the functional product feature.  In other words, when market access 
and competition run in tension with the trademark holder’s interests in protecting its 
product-associated goodwill, the competitive interests trump.47   
Many venerable doctrines of trademark law reflect these general guiding 
principles.  The genericness doctrine, for example, prevents a party from claiming rights 
to a term “that refers, or has come to be understood as referring, to the genus of which the 
particular product is a species.”48  Competitors, in other words, have the right to explain 
what they are selling, even when their use of the generic term clearly piggy-backs on the 
efforts of the party that first introduced the product.49  The genericness doctrine arises out 
of a concern for consumer search costs.  Consumers will be misled if what they believe is 
                                                 
46 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34-35 (2001).  On the 
contours of trademark functionality doctrine, see Mark A. Thurmon, The Rise and Fall of 
Trademark Law’s Functionality Doctrine, 56 Fla. L. Rev. 243 (2004); Robert Denicola, 
Freedom to Copy, 108 Yale L.J. 1661 (1999). 
47 See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 122 (Brandeis, J.) (“Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing 
in the goodwill of the article known as ‘Shredded Wheat’; and thus is sharing in a market 
which was created by the skill and judgment of plaintiff’s predecessor and has been 
widely extended by vast expenditures in advertising persistently made.  But that is not 
unfair.  Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trademark is the 
exercise of a right possessed by all – and in the free exercise of which the consuming 
public is deeply interested.”). 
48 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976). 
49 See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. at 122; Abercrombie & Fitch, 
537 F.2d at 9 (“no matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has 
poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it has achieved in 
securing public identification, it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product 
of the right to call an article by its name”); see also J. Kohnstam, Ltd. v. Louis Marx and 
Company, 280 F.2d 437, 440 (C.C.P.A. 1960).  
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a generic term is in fact a product sold by only one company.50  And if competitors 
cannot use the generic term to describe their own products, consumers will incur 
unnecessary expense in trying to locate the competitors’ versions.  At the same time, the 
genericness doctrine can impose search costs on consumers, particularly when a once-
famous mark such as “aspirin” or “thermos” becomes generic.  Consumers who associate 
the famous mark with the company that uses it may well be confused when competitors 
begin using the mark as a generic term.51  The law is willing to make that sacrifice once a 
critical mass of consumers treat the term as generic, because the harm to them outweighs 
the harm to the diminishing number of consumers who view the term only as a mark.52  
Even so, courts sometimes take steps to protect trademark owners in this situation, for 
example by establishing rules requiring competitors who adopt a generic term that was 
once a protectable trademark to take steps to minimize confusion with the former mark 
owner.53   
                                                 
50   See, e.g., Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (Hand, J.); 
Landes & Posner, supra note __, at 296; Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, 
Trademarked Generic Words, 89 Yale L.J. 1323, 1337, 1342-43 (1980). 
51   For discussion of the loss of producer goodwill when a mark is declared generic, see 
Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68 Chi.-
Kent L. Rev. 715 (1993).  On the interrelationship between genericide and patent 
protection, see Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116-18 (1938).  Cf. 
Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated Theory of Intellectual 
Property, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1455 (2002). 
52   See, e.g., Folsom & Teply, supra note __, at 1340-41; Landes & Posner, article, supra 
note __, at 292; see also Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. 
L.J. 287, 315-23 (1988) (noting that generic terms are “extraordinary ideas” that should 
remain open for all to use).   
53   Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137, 150 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(plaintiff’s mark “Honey Brown Ale” was generic, but defendant could still be liable if it 
did not use “every reasonable means to prevent confusion” in using the generic term); See 
also Forschner Group Inc. v. Arrow Trading Co., 124 F.3d 402 (2d Cir. 1997); Home 
Builders Ass’n of Greater St. Louis v. L&L Exhibition Mgmt., 226 F.3d 944 (8th Cir. 
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The functionality doctrine likewise prevents parties from claiming trademark 
rights in a product feature that “’is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it 
affects the cost or quality of the article.’”54  Even when consumers have come to 
associate a particular feature with a single seller, it cannot serve as a trademark if 
exclusive use of it would put competitors at a disadvantage.55  The connection between 
the functionality doctrine and a functioning market is even more fundamental than search 
costs – consumers cannot choose between competing products if one manufacturer can 
use a law designed to reduce consumer search costs to eliminate competing products 
altogether.  Preventing trademark owners from protecting functional aspects of their 
products is therefore consistent with a search costs rationale.  Because functional 
characteristics, aesthetic appeal, and source-identifying information may sometimes be 
lumped together in the same product, however – think of the Ferrari56 – the functionality 
doctrine has the potential to increase consumer search costs in some cases.57  When a 
                                                                                                                                                 
2000). 
54 TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 32-33; see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 
U.S. 159, 165 (1985). 
55 See TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 34-35 (“The Lanham Act … does not protect trade 
dress in a functional design simply because an investment has been made to encourage 
the public to associate a particular functional feature with a single manufacturer or 
seller.”). 
56   See, e.g., Ferrari s.p.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding the exterior 
design of the Ferrari nonfunctional). 
57   See, e.g., Peter E. Mims, Promotional Goods and the Functionality Doctrine: An 
Economic Model of Trademarks, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 639, 658-59 (1984) (recognizing the 
role that the functionality doctrine plays in lowering search costs, but arguing that the 
doctrine of aesthetic functionality interferes with that role).  For academic commentary 
on the functionality doctrine and the tradeoffs it embodies, see, e.g., Maury Audet, 
Functionality Unanimously Trumps Incontestability After Trademark Law Treaty Act, 40 
Idea 473 (2000); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological 
Approach to Trademark Law, 84 Iowa L. Rev. 611 (1999); Thurmon, supra note __. 
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functional product feature has achieved secondary meaning, for example, some 
consumers might assume that all products with that feature come from a single source.  
As with generic marks, however, courts have responded to this possibility not by 
prohibiting use of the feature, but by requiring competitors to “use reasonable care to 
inform the public of the source of [their] product[s].”58  To the extent that the use may 
even then mislead some members of the public, the functionality doctrine presupposes 
that the harm to consumers in these cases is outweighed by the greater availability of 
competitive products in the first place.  
In all of the examples described above, the law seeks to minimize consumer 
search costs.  While trademark law generally does that by providing protection to 
trademark owners, sometimes achieving that goal requires limiting the scope of 
trademark rights.  In these instances, the interests of robust competition and reducing 
search costs outweigh the interest of the trademark claimant in appropriating the full 
value of its goodwill.  The law limits trademark rights in these cases despite the apparent 
windfall to competitors.  The genericness and functionality doctrines present “hard cases” 
precisely because there are search cost rationales on both sides of the argument. 
The rule that competition and information dissemination trump trademark holder 
economic interests where the two conflict applies with even more force when the use that 
a competitor wishes to make of a trademarked term is one that unambiguously reduces 
                                                 
58 Gum, Inc. v. Gumakers of America, Inc., 136 F.2d 957, 960 (3d Cir. 1943) (citing 
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938)); American Greetings 
Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1986) (“if the functional 
feature or combination is also found to have secondary meaning, the imitator may be 
required to take reasonable steps to minimize the risk of source confusion”); cf. American 
Fork & Hoe Co. v. Stampit Corp., 125 F.2d 472, 475 (6th Cir. 1942) (“in order to 
establish even the limited right of compelling appellant to take positive steps to avoid 
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search costs.  Resellers of both new and used products, for example, have a right to use 
trademarks to describe the items that they sell.  “The result is, of course, that the second-
hand dealer gets some advantage from the trade mark.  But … that rule is wholly 
permissible so long as the manufacturer is not identified with the inferior qualities of the 
product resulting from wear and tear or the reconditioning by the dealer.”59  Competitors, 
moreover, may use descriptive marks in their non-trademark sense, to describe the 
features or qualities of their own products.60 
Perhaps most significantly in light of the recent trends in trademark law, 
competitors have an affirmative right to use others’ trademarks to capture public attention 
in an attempt to divert it to their own products.  As long as they do not mislead people 
into presuming some kind of affiliation between themselves and the trademark holder, 
competitors may use the mark to explain that their product imitates or aspires to the 
qualities of the trademark holder’s goods.  In Saxlehner v. Wagner,61 the Supreme Court 
allowed a natural water producer to use its competitor’s mark to identify the product that 
it was copying.  Justice Holmes explained that, as long as the defendants did not create 
                                                                                                                                                 
confusion, the existence of secondary meaning must plainly appear”). 
59 Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 130 (1947).  In cases involving 
used or reconditioned products, courts require disclosure of that fact rather than 
preventing the seller from using the manufacturer’s trademark.  See id. at 130.  Compare 
Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc. v. Michel Co., 179 F.3d 704, 709-10 (9th Cir. 1999) (refusing 
to allow reseller to use Rolex mark when modifications to watches were so substantial 
that they “result in a new product”). 
60 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (no infringement when a term is used fairly and in good 
faith to describe the goods or services of the party); Zatarain’s, Inc. v. Oak Grove 
Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983); see also Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. 
Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995) (“it should make no difference 
whether the plaintiff’s mark is to be classed on the descriptive tier of the trademark 
ladder . . . . What matters is whether the defendant is using the protected word or image 
descriptively, and not as a trademark”). 
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confusion about the real source of their product, they were free to “tell the public what 
they are doing, and to get whatever share they can in the popularity of the water by 
advertising that they are trying to make the same article, and think that they succeed.”62  
The Court distinguished between deceptive appropriation of goodwill and legitimate 
comparative advertising, concluding that by flagging its product as an imitator of the 
original, “they are not trying to get the good will of the name, but the good will of the 
goods.”63   
Similarly, in Smith v. Chanel, Inc.,64 the court allowed a knock-off perfume 
manufacturer to advertise that its perfume smelled like Chanel No. 5.65  The court 
dismissed Chanel’s argument “that protection should also be extended to the trademark’s 
commercially more important function of embodying consumer good will created 
through extensive, skillful, and costly advertising,” reasoning that “the courts … have 
generally confined legal protection to the trademark’s source identification function for 
reasons grounded in the public policy favoring a free, competitive economy.”66  Landes 
                                                                                                                                                 
61 216 U.S. 375 (1910). 
62 216 U.S. at 380-81. 
63 Id. 
64 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968). 
65 The defendant’s advertisements included at least two references to Chanel No. 5.  In 
one reference, the defendant challenged consumers:  “We dare you to try to detect any 
difference between Chanel #5 ($25) and Ta’Ron’s 2nd Chance.  $7.00.”  The 
corresponding order form listed “Second Chance” with “(Chanel #5)” just below it.  Id. at 
563.  Accord Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Lenox Labs., 815 F.3d 500 (8th Cir. 1987); 
G.D. Searle & Co. v. Hudson Pharmaceutical Corp., 715 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1983) (generic 
could advertise that its product was “equivalent to” plaintiff’s, as long as it was 
accompanied by a disclaimer); Upjohn Co. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 598 F. Supp. 
550 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (maker of Advil could advertise equivalent strength to Motrin by 
using the Motrin mark). 
66 Id. at 566. 
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& Posner explain that the result in Smith is entirely consistent with the search costs 
rationale:  “It would have been very costly for consumers to acquire such information 
[about the smell of the original perfume and the copy] before purchasing the copier’s 
perfume because the perfume was sold through the mail.”67 
The same rationale has led courts to allow generic manufacturers to imitate 
branded trade dress in a way that evokes but doesn’t confuse.68  These cases, like the 
others involving comparative advertising, emphasize that the public benefits from having 
fuller information about the products available in the marketplace.69  The consumer 
search cost rationale thus both justifies trademark protection in the first place, and helps 
to set the limits on the scope of that protection. 
Two final limiting doctrines help to ensure that the trademark grant does not stifle 
informative speech by non-competitors.  First, to infringe, a defendant must “use” a mark 
“in commerce,” “on or in connection with any goods or services….”70  Courts historically 
                                                 
67   Landes & Posner, supra note __, at 206. 
68 See American Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1058, 1068 (D.N.J. 
1987); see also Conopco, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 46 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 
1994) (finding no infringement when private label retailer “packages its product in a 
manner to make it clear to the consumer that the product is similar to the national brand, 
and is intended for the same purposes”). 
69 American Home Prods., 656 F. Supp. at 1068 (“The resemblance between two 
products can alert consumers to the functional or utilitarian equivalence between them, to 
the fact that one product may be substituted for the other in the ultimate uses for which 
the products are intended. The free flow of information regarding the substitutability of 
products is valuable to individual consumers and to society collectively, and by providing 
it a supplier engages in fair competition based on those aspects—for example, price—in 
which the products differ.”). 
70 43 U.S.C. § 1125; see also id. § 1114.  The act defines “use in commerce” as “the bona 
fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right 
in a mark.”  A use qualifies as a use in commerce on goods only when “(A) it is placed in 
any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays associated therewith or on the 
tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods makes such placement 
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insisted that trademark “use” required that the defendant market goods or services under 
the mark.71  As the Eighth Circuit recently explained, “the mark holder is generally not 
entitled to relief unless the defendant advertises or otherwise promotes [the actual mark] 
thereby causing the public to see the protected mark and associate the infringer’s goods 
or services with those of the mark holder.”72  Limiting trademark rights to a right to 
prevent confusing uses of the mark as a brand helps ensure that trademark rights remain 
tied to their search cost rationale – only those individuals or companies who are using the 
mark to advertise their own products or services have the motive and opportunity to 
interfere with the clarity of the mark’s meaning in conveying product information to 
consumers, and so only those uses ought to be of concern to trademark law.73 
Second, and relatedly, defendants who do not themselves “use” a mark in 
commerce can face liability for another’s infringement only if they actively induce that 
infringement, or knowingly help to bring it about.74  By limiting trademark claims to 
those who themselves use marks in a way that suggests some affiliation between 
                                                                                                                                                 
impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or their sale, and (B) the 
goods are transported in commerce.”  For services, a use qualifies “when it is used or 
displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce 
. . . .”  Id. § 1127. 
71   See, e.g., Felix the Cat Prods. v. New Line Cinema Corp., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1856, 1858 
(C.D. Cal. 2000) (“Use of the character as an expression of an idea or device to ‘set the 
mood’ of the Picture does not qualify as use of the mark ‘to identify or distinguish’ goods 
‘to indicate their source’ as required to fall under the purview of trademark law.”). 
72 DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932, 939 (8th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added). 
73 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires a “commercial use in commerce of a 
mark or trade name,” a standard which more explicitly incorporates the use requirement 
by applying only to “commercial speech” as that term is defined in First Amendment 
jurisprudence – speech which proposes a commercial transaction.  H.R. Rep. 104-374, 
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 
905-06 (9th Cir. 2002). 
74 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
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themselves and the trademark holder (and to others intimately involved in their 
infringement) the law ensures that information facilitators, publishers, and others who 
bear only a tangential relationship to trademark infringement can go about their business 
without the responsibility of having to police all of the parties with whom they have 
commercial relations. 
 
C. Alternatives to the Search Costs Rationale 
There are other economic justifications sometimes offered for trademark law.75  
Some have spoken of trademark law as promoting a “signaling” function of advertising.  
Others talk about the growth of national brands as facilitating the expansion of companies 
into different territories and product markets.  Still others reason that trademarks are a 
form of property, and their owners are therefore are entitled to a broad right to prevent 
others from using the marks.76  These alternative justifications should not distract the 
reader from a proper focus on search costs, however.   
The signaling theory suggests that firms advertise because the fact that they can 
afford to advertise signals that their goods are of higher quality, since the advertising 
pays off.  But this theory is problematic, because it works only if no one knows about it.  
If consumers actually treat advertising as a signal of quality, makers of low-quality goods 
                                                 
75   Noneconomic justifications for trademark law are rare, and we do not consider them 
here.  For one example, see Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 
UCLA L. Rev. 621 (2004); see generally Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and 
Trademark Puzzles, __ Va. L. Rev. __ (2004) (June 2004 draft at 12-20) (summarizing, 
and rejecting, various non-economic justifications for trademark law). 
76   See Lemley, supra note 24, at 1690-91 and sources cited therein (discussing other 
economic justifications for trademark law, including the “signaling” theory and “the role 
of trademarks in allowing the growth of complex, long-term organizations spread over a 
wide geographic area”).   
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have an incentive to deceive those consumers by advertising their goods, leading the 
consumer to mistakenly believe they are of high quality.  Signaling theory is therefore 
self-limiting. 
The role of trademarks in franchising, brand differentiation, and national 
expansion is indeed an important one.77  But that role is consistent with – and indeed 
subsidiary to – the search costs rationale we discuss in text.  Trademarks can serve as the 
basis for franchising or expansion into related markets only to the extent that consumers 
connect the mark with the maker of a set of core products.  If the mark is not serving that 
purpose, building a national reputation on the basis of it will prove impossible.  Some 
have suggested that companies who leverage their brand into multiple products are 
diluting this connection, interfering with consumer search costs.78  But companies have 
an incentive to maintain the value of their brand, and in a competitive market they are 
unlikely to expand the reach of a single trademark so far that consumers are confused 
rather than enlightened by the use of the brand name.79   
Finally, it is increasingly common to simply assume that trademarks are a form of 
(intellectual) property, and therefore that their “owner” is entitled to control virtually any 
use of them.  There are several problems with this rationale.  First, it is not true that even 
                                                 
77   See, e.g., Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological 
Age 645-46 (3d ed. 2003); Mira Wilkins, The Neglected Intangible Asset: The Influence 
of the Trademark on the Rise of the Modern Corporation, 34 Bus. & Hist. 66, 87-88 
(1992).   
78   See Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 
731 (2003). 
79   Indeed, most large multi-product companies, such as 3M and Proctor & Gamble, 
maintain hundreds or even thousands of different brands, suggesting that they see the 
importance of limiting the use they make of any single trademark.  
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the owners of real property have unlimited power over their land.80  Second, intellectual 
property is fundamentally different from real property, and the rights granted to owners 
of patents and copyrights are substantially weaker than those granted to real property 
owners.81 Third, and most important, trademarks are not like other forms of intellectual 
property.  We grant patents and copyrights in order to encourage the creation of patented 
and copyrighted works.  There is no similar need to encourage the creation of brands.  
While it is occasionally suggested that trademarks are protected in order to encourage the 
creation of new brands,82 that is not in fact a generally accepted rationale for trademark 
protection, with good reason.  As the Fourth Circuit observed decades ago, “a man of 
ordinary intelligence could easily devise a score of valid trade-marks in a short period of 
time.”83  Without such a rationale, calling trademarks property reduces to an unsupported 
conclusion that we should grant a certain set of rights over language without an 
accompanying justification.84 
                                                 
80   See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons:  The Evolution of Institutions 
for Collective Action 23 (1990); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, 
Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 711, 769 (1986).  
Thomas Grey argued more than two decades ago that the concept of property as a 
“bundle of rights” meant that property interests were necessarily disaggregated and 
context-specific. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in Property:  Nomos 
XXII 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980); see also Michael A. 
Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 Duke L.J. 1 
(2004) (June 2004 draft at 68-100) (describing legal limitations on real and personal 
property rights). 
81   For a detailed discussion, see Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and 
Free Riding, (working paper 2004). 
82   See Vincent Chiappetta, Trademarks: More than Meets the Eye, 2003 U. Ill. J. L, 
Tech. & Pol’y 35, 37. 
83   Ambrosia Chocolate Co. v. Ambrosia Cake Bakery, 165 F.2d 693, 697 (4th Cir. 1947). 
84   This is not to say that trademark law has no incentive basis.  But trademark law 
diverges from copyright and patent law in the aim of those incentives.  Trademark law, 
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II. The Dismantling of Trademark Standards in Internet Cases 
 Perhaps ironically, the Internet – with its promise as an informational mecca85 – 
has triggered a rethinking of the rules of trademark law in a way that could well restrict 
the free flow of comparative information in the marketplace.  Courts in Internet cases 
have resurrected the oft-rejected unjust enrichment rationale for trademark rights, and 
have used it as the basis for a steady expansion of trademark holders’ rights, in two 
distinct directions.  First, a handful of courts have widened the net of trademark 
infringement to encompass search engines, advertising firms, and others who help 
competitors to reach their audience through nontraditional “use” of established marks.  
Second, courts have extended the definition of actionable confusion to include the mere 
possibility of customer diversion to competitors’ websites, even in some cases in which 
the consumer knows where she is headed at all times.  Both of these expansions 
undermine the core goal of trademark law – to reduce consumer search costs and increase 
the availability of information in the marketplace.  Their combination in cases like 
                                                                                                                                                 
by protecting the integrity of branding and advertising information in the marketplace, 
provides businesses with an incentive to provide consistency in the quality of their 
products and services.  But unlike patent and copyright law, it does not aim to incentivize 
the development of the intellectual property – i.e., the trademark – itself.   
85   See, e.g., Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. Chi. 
Legal. F. 217, 236 (1996); Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and 
Contract in the "Newtonian World of On- line Commerce", 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 115, 
130 (1997).  But cf. J. Bradford DeLong & A. Michael Froomkin, Speculative 
Microeconomics for Tomorrow's Economy, in Internet Publishing and Beyond: The 
Economics of Digital Information and Intellectual Property 10-13 (Brian Kahin & 
Hal R.Varian eds., 2000), available at http://www.law.miami.edu/~ 
froomkin/articles/spec.htm (pointing to ways in which ecommerce companies have tried 
to prevent the elimination of transaction costs online); cf. Maureen A. O’Rourke, 
Common Law and Statutory Restrictions on Access:  Contract, Trespass, and the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 2002 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol’y 295. 
Internet Search Costs – Dogan & Lemley  DRAFT 
 31 
Playboy v. Netscape86 and 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com87 is particularly 
problematic. 
 Playboy v. Netscape involved a suit against Netscape based on its use of 
trademarks as “keywords” to help target advertising to relevant audiences.  Netscape’s 
search engine, like most such services, offered advertisements alongside the search 
results generated in response to user queries.  Netscape had allowed – indeed, required – 
adult services that advertised through its search engine to include “Playboy” as one of the 
search terms that, if entered by users, would generate an ad on Netscape’s search results 
page.  The Ninth Circuit held that this use of the “Playboy” mark could confuse 
consumers into believing that the advertisers were affiliated with Playboy,88 and that 
Netscape could face legal responsibility for creating that confusion.  In allowing 
Playboy’s claim against Netscape to proceed, the Ninth Circuit decided not to choose 
between a direct and contributory infringement theory, concluding “that defendants are 
either directly or contributorily liable,” so that it “need not decide” which.89  While the 
court’s reasoning remains a mystery, the decision left no doubt that, in the panel’s view, 
the Lanham Act could reach parties that used trademarks, not as brands, but as 
classification tools for targeting advertisements whose content they did not control.   
 In the 1-800 Contacts case,90 a trademark holder sued to prevent the use of its 
mark to generate pop-up advertisements.  The plaintiff, which sold contact lenses under 
                                                 
86   354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
87   2003 WL 22999270 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003). 
88  See infra notes __ and accompanying text. 
89 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
90 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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the mark “1-800 Contacts,” sought to prevent its competitors’ pop-up ads from being 
displayed when users entered <www.1800contacts.com> into their web browser or used 
the “1-800 Contacts” mark as a query in an Internet search.  Plaintiff sued both the 
advertisers and the firm whose software generated the pop-up ads, claiming that both had 
“used” its marks in a way that created a likelihood of confusion among consumers.  In 
allowing the claims to proceed, the court held that both categories of defendants had 
“used” the trademark as contemplated by the Lanham Act.  First, the court held that by 
generating pop-up ads to appear “when users have specifically attempted to access 
Plaintiff's website – on which Plaintiff's trademark appears – Defendants are displaying 
Plaintiff's mark ‘in the ... advertising of’” the defendant advertiser’s competing services.91   
Second, by including the trademark in a directory of terms that trigger advertisements on 
computers that use defendant’s software, the software developer “used” the mark “to 
advertise and publicize companies that are in direct competition with Plaintiff.”92  In 
doing so, the court put itself in direct conflict with the only two other cases to consider 
trademark liability for pop-up ads.93 
 
A. Should Intermediaries Face Liability at All for Trademark 
Infringement? 
 1. Trademark Use 
                                                 
91  Id. at 489. 
92  Id. 
93 See U-Haul Int’l v. WhenU.com, 279 F. Supp.2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding that use 
of mark to generate pop-up ad was not trademark “use” within meaning of Lanham Act); 
Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, 293 F. Supp. 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (same). 
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 The Playboy and 1-800 Contacts cases demonstrate a disturbing trend away from 
the statutory requirement of trademark use, at least as traditionally interpreted by the 
courts.  The Lanham Act prohibits only use of a trademark “in connection with” the 
offering of goods or services in commerce, and defines such a use as occurring in the 
context of services “when [the mark] is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of 
services and the services are rendered in commerce."94  It is the use of the mark to brand 
or advertise the defendant’s services – so-called “trademark use” – that triggers 
trademark law.95   
 The trademark use requirement serves a gatekeeper function, limiting the reach of 
trademark law without regard to a factual inquiry into consumer confusion.  The rationale 
for the doctrine stems from the practical reality that it would be both unwise and 
impossible to permit trademark owners to control every use of their mark.  People and 
businesses use trademarks every day, in conversation, in news reporting, in songs and in 
books.  Trademark law has never given trademark owners exclusive control over any use 
of their marks.  Rather, the law is designed to prevent consumer confusion by those who 
brand their own goods or services with a mark sufficiently similar to the plaintiff’s mark 
                                                 
94   15 U.S.C. § 1127.   
95   See, e.g., Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 86 F.3d 619, 623-25 (6th Cir. 
1996) (holding that the use of a telephone number that translated into 1-800-H0LIDAY – 
with a zero in place of the “O” – was not trademark “use” within the Lanham Act 
because the defendant had not advertised its services under the offending alphabetical 
translation); Daimler-Chrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2003); cf. Lone Star 
Steakhouse v. Longhorn Steaks, 106 F.3d 355, 361 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that use of a 
mark “on a sign displayed on an interior wall of Plaintiff’s … [r]estaurant … did not 
constitute a valid service mark use because it was not being used to identify or 
distinguish the services being offered”); Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. 
Network Solutions, 989 F. Supp. 1276 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. 
Network Solutions, 985 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d on other grounds 194 F.3d 
980 (9th Cir. 1999); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, 141 F. Supp. 2d 648 
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that consumers may be deceived into believing there is some connection between the two.  
Individuals and companies may make reference to or use of a trademark without fear of 
liability unless they are making a trademark use.   
 The courts that have found Internet service companies liable for initial interest 
confusion err by holding that using a trademarked term as a “trigger” for supplying an 
advertisement is a trademark use of that term.  Both 1-800 Contacts and Playboy make 
this error.96  The courts appear to have been misled by the similarity in terminology of 
two very different elements of a trademark cause of action: the “use in commerce” 
requirement and the “trademark use” requirement.  It is true that in both these cases the 
trademarks are used in interstate commerce in the minimal way necessary to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts.97  Unfortunately, an increasing number of courts 
apparently believe that satisfying this minimal requirement is the same as proving that the 
defendants had made trademark use of the plaintiff’s brand.98  As a result, they do not 
analyze the requirement of trademark use directly.  This is a crucial error.99  Courts 
                                                                                                                                                 
(N.D. Tex. 2001).   
96   Playboy v. Netscape, 354 F.3d at __; 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d at 489. 
97   Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) (holding that the Constitution did not 
authorize federal trademark protection unless a mark was used in interstate commerce).   
98   This error may be traceable to the district court in Planned Parenthood v. Bucci, 42 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), which seemed to conflate the two.   
99   Other courts, by contrast, understand the distinction.  See U-Haul Int’l v. WhenU.com, 
279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 2003) (holding that selling a pop-up advertisement based 
on a trademarked keyword was not trademark use and was therefore not infringing); 
Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (same); 
German Court Holds Use of Competitor’s Mark in Web Site Metatags No Infringement, 9 
Elec. Comm. & L. Rpt. 289 (March 24, 2004) (reporting on a German appeals court 
decision holding that use of a trademark in metatags was not an “exploitation” of the 
mark).  But see German Court Blocks Pop-Up Advertisements, 
http://news.com.com/2100-1024_3-5180240.html (reporting on a European court 
decision enjoining pop-up and pop-under ads). 
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outside the United States also exhibit confusion about the proper scope of trademark use, 
though they have no jurisdictional “use in commerce” requirement to apply and so are led 
astray in other ways.100 
 Selling advertising space based on an Internet keyword that is also a trademark 
does not use that trademark as a brand.  The Internet intermediary is not selling any 
product or service using those terms as an identifier.  It is perhaps, as the 1-800 Contacts 
court notes, “allowing [the advertiser] to profit from the goodwill” of that mark.101  But it 
is not illegal simply to make money in a way that involves the use of a trademark.  
Indeed, courts considering analogous situations have rejected trademark claims on the 
ground that the defendant was not engaged in trademark use.  For example, a number of 
plaintiffs have sued Internet domain name registrars such as Network Solutions for 
selling their trademark as a domain name to a cybersquatter who uses the name to 
infringe the trademark.  There is no question that Network Solutions is trading on the 
                                                 
100   In Viaticum/Luteciel v. Google France, RG No. 03/00051 (Nanterre Ct. of First 
Instance Oct. 13, 2003), the French district court held that any use of a registered mark 
for any purpose was illegal, and enjoined an Internet search engine from permitting 
advertisements to appear when consumers searched for a trademarked term, even if those 
advertisements were keyed off of a different, generic term.  And in Metaspinner v. 
Google, cite, the German district court in Hamburg found that a search engine engaged in 
trademark use when it sold advertising space based on keywords identical to the 
plaintiff’s trademark.   
 However, other European cases reach the opposite conclusion.  In Nemetschek v. 
Google, No. 33 O 21461/03 (Dist. Ct. Munich Feb. 12, 2003), the court held that an 
Internet search engine was not liable for direct or indirect trademark infringement when 
an advertiser placed ads based on trademarked keywords.  And in Intershop Comms. v. 
Tietz, No. 315 O 646/03 (Dist. Ct. Hamburg Feb. 25, 2004), the same court that decided 
Metaspinner found that the advertiser had not engaged in trademark use by selecting a 
trademarked keyword.  The Hamburg cases in particular seem to get the doctrine of 
trademark use exactly backwards, since if anyone is engaging in a trademark use it is the 
advertiser selecting a competitor’s mark as a keyword, not the search engine that sells 
advertising space. 
101   309 F. Supp. 2d at 490. 
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goodwill of the trademark owner – it is making money by selling a domain name 
incorporating the mark itself.  Nor is there any question that Network Solutions is 
engaged in interstate commerce.  Nonetheless, courts uniformly hold that Network 
Solutions cannot be held liable as a direct infringer because it is not using the protected 
term as a trademark.102  The domain name registrants themselves may engage in 
trademark use by cybersquatting or confusing visitors to the site, but the company selling 
the domain names does not.  Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held in Daimler-Chrysler AG v. 
Bloom that a telecommunications company did not use the term “Mercedes” in a 
trademark sense merely by licensing a vanity phone number that spelled 1-800-
MERCEDES to Mercedes dealers.103  The dealers themselves might engage in trademark 
use by advertising the phone number or otherwise presenting it as a brand to the public, 
the court reasoned, but the company selling the phone number did not.  Likewise, 
WhenU’s customers may or may not make trademark use of the term “1-800 Contacts” in 
their ads, but WhenU itself doesn’t make trademark use.104 
By recognizing that advertisers may, in some cases, be engaged in trademark 
“use” in connection with their ads, we do not mean to suggest that purchasing a 
trademarked keyword constitutes such use.  Trademark liability would arise, if at all, 
                                                 
102   See Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences v. Network Solutions, 989 F. 
Supp. 1276 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, 985 F. Supp. 
949 (C.D. Cal. 1997), aff’d on other grounds 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999); Lockheed 
Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, 141 F. Supp. 2d 648 (N.D. Tex. 2001).  In the 
Central District Lockheed Martin case, the Ninth Circuit held on appeal that Lockheed 
had no trademark claim against Network Solutions because Network Solutions merely 
provided a service that helped others to infringe, an act which is not illegal under 
trademark law.  That reasoning is certainly applicable to Internet search engines. 
103   315 F.3d 932 (8th Cir. 2003). 
104   See also Voice-Tel Ents. v. Joba, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1363 (N.D. Ga. 2003) 
(holding that linking to a site cannot constitute dilution). 
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from the content and context of the ad itself, rather than the mere use of the mark as a 
classification tool.  The speech-oriented objectives of the trademark use doctrine105 
protect more than just intermediaries; they prevent trademark holders from asserting a 
generalized right to control language, an interest that applies equally – and sometimes 
especially – when the speaker competes directly with the trademark holder.  The 
trademark use doctrine has broad application – because of it, newspapers are not liable 
for using a trademarked term in a headline, even if the use is confusing or misleading.  
Makers of telephone directories aren’t liable for putting all the ads for taxi services 
together on the same page.  Marketing surveyors aren’t liable for asking people what they 
think of a competitor’s brand-name product.  Magazines aren’t liable for selling 
advertising that relates to the content of their special issues, even when that content 
involves trademark owners.  Gas stations and restaurants are not liable for locating across 
the street from an established competitor, trading on the attraction the established 
company has created or benefiting from the size of the sign the established company has 
put up.  Individuals are not liable for their use of a trademark in conversation, even in an 
inaccurate or misleading way (referring to a Puffs brand facial tissue as a “Kleenex,” or a 
competing cola as a “Coke,” for instances).  Generic drug manufacturers aren’t liable for 
placing their drugs near their brand-name equivalents on drug store shelves, and the 
stores aren’t liable for accepting the placement.  While some of these users are 
intermediaries (telephone directories, magazines, and pharmacies) or third parties with no 
                                                 
105   Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the 
Pepsi Generation, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397 (1990) (warning of this danger and 
proposing to solve it by rendering terms “expressively generic” if society wishes to 
appropriate them for cultural use).  Cf. Litman, Batman, supra note __, at 1732-33 
(discussing the pervasiveness of trademarked symbols in popular culture). 
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commercial interest in the market in question (newspapers, individuals), others – like the 
companies doing market research, locating their gas stations and restaurants, or selling 
generic drugs – are direct competitors.  They may be making money from their “uses” of 
the trademark, and the uses may be ones the trademark owner objects to, but they are not 
trademark uses and are therefore not within the ambit of the statute.   
The trademark use doctrine is entirely consistent with the search costs rationale 
that lies at the heart of trademark law.  Requiring trademark use furthers the fundamental 
goal of lowering search costs by permitting individuals, companies, and the media to use 
a mark to refer to the product or service being trademarked.  Just because consumers are 
searching for a product using the trademark doesn’t mean that they only want information 
from the trademark owner.106  The law permits newspapers, individuals who have bought 
the product, Consumer Reports, online evaluation and comparison sites like epinions, and 
a host of others – including even competitors – to avoid circumlocution and talk about the 
trademarked product using the trademark.107  Trademark owners might not always like 
what these third parties have to say, but letting them say it furthers the larger goal of 
getting information about the product in the hands of consumers.108   
                                                 
106   See, e.g., Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy, supra note __, at [draft at 6-22] 
(discussing the various reasons an Internet searcher might type a trademark into a search 
engine). 
107   Creating circumlocutions to avoid trademarks is costly.  See Folsom &. Teply, supra 
note __, at 1340-42 (1980); Landes & Posner, article, supra note __, at 288, 292. 
108   It is true that consumers may sometimes get too much information, and that just like 
too little information, too much relevant information can increase search costs.  But as 
Goldman points out, intermediaries like search engines generally have incentives to help 
consumers solve this problem by finding the most relevant information.  Goldman, supra 
note __, at __.  Thus, Google will remove ads entirely if consumers aren’t clicking on 
them, because its goal is to facilitate rather than impede user search. 
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Maintaining the focus on search costs is critical to keeping the doctrine of 
trademark use alive.  It is far too easy for courts and commentators to slip into the 
rhetoric of “free riding” and “unfair competition.”109  We must keep in mind that not all 
commercial uses of a mark are or should be impermissible.110  Remembering to ask why 
we are protecting the mark in the first place will go a long way towards helping to 
distinguish legitimate from illegitimate uses of the mark. 
 
 2. Contributory Infringement 
 Even companies who do not themselves make trademark use may be liable in 
certain limited circumstances as contributory infringers.111  Like its distant cousins in 
patent and copyright law, the doctrine of contributory trademark infringement requires 
proof of an act of direct infringement by someone else.  There can be no contributory 
liability if there is no infringement to contribute to.  But unlike patent and copyright law, 
the doctrine of contributory trademark infringement is narrowly drawn.112  It has 
traditionally been limited to cases of actual inducement to infringe or to cases in which 
                                                 
109   Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding (vaporware 
2004) (noting how these conclusions tend to flow without analysis from the conclusion 
that a legal right is “property”). 
110   As Wendy Gordon so eloquently put it, “[a] culture could not exist if all free riding 
were prohibited within it.”  Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual 
Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 Va. L. Rev. 149, 167 (1992).   
111   The Playboy v. Netscape court finessed this distinction, holding that it did not decide 
whether direct or contributory infringement applied because it was sure that it was one or 
the other.  Id. at __.  This judicial sleight-of-hand allowed the court to confuse the 
elements of the two causes of action, finding Netscape liable based on legal standards 
that apply only to direct infringers without actually finding that Netscape was such a 
direct infringer. 
112   See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (trademark law 
has a “narrow standard” for contributory infringement; court distinguishes the broader 
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the maker of a product continues to supply that product to one it knows is engaging in 
trademark infringement using that product.113  The goal of the doctrine is to permit the 
enforcement of counterfeiting law against those who made the counterfeit goods, and not 
merely against those who applied the labels.114  By contrast, liability for the provision of 
a service is extremely rare in trademark law, and requires that the defendant be in direct 
control of and monitoring the third party infringer.115  There is no affirmative duty to 
investigate or take precautions against infringement by a third party; liability arises only 
if a service provider has actual knowledge of infringement using a service under its direct 
control.116   
 As we argued above,117 the courts to have found initial interest confusion online 
may have erred by concluding that a competitor that locates its product near the 
trademark owner’s product in Internet “space” has engaged in an illegal use of the 
trademark.  They may also have erred by assuming that any such use is confusing, a 
matter we take up below.118  They then compound these errors by expanding liability 
from direct competitors who make such a use to anyone who helps them to do so, 
undermining the principles of trademark law in the process.  Under the rationale of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
patent and copyright standards). 
113   Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982). 
114   See generally John T. Cross, Contributory Infringement and Related Theories of 
Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 101, 105 (1994) 
(“Because a product supplier is in direct competition, these contributory infringement 
cases involve special considerations that are not necessarily present in cases in which the 
defendant contributes to infringement in some way other than supplying the product.”). 
115   Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).   
116   Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., 955 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1992). 
117   See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text (discussing trademark use). 
118   See infra notes __-__ and accompanying text (discussing initial interest confusion). 
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Playboy and 1-800 Contacts courts, magazine publishers could be held liable for selling 
advertising space in conjunction with a special issue, on the theory that the juxtaposition 
between the ads and the stories would draw people’s attention to the ads.  Billboard 
owners could be liable for selling billboard space near a Burger King to McDonald’s.  
Web hosting services could be liable for the misleading content of the sites they host.   
Early Internet decisions wisely refrained from imposing these burdens on Internet 
service companies.  In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions,119 the Ninth Circuit 
rejected the argument that Network Solutions, which sold Internet domain names such as 
microsoft.com and mcdonalds.com to cybersquatters, had a duty to screen the domain 
names in question to weed out potentially infringing ones.  The court agreed with the 
District Court’s conclusion that there is “no affirmative duty to police the Internet in 
search of potentially infringing uses of domain names.”120  A closer analogy to the sale of 
advertising based on keywords is harder to imagine.  Network Solutions was “trading on 
the goodwill” of trademark owners by selling domain names that included their marks, to 
at least as great an extent as Netscape or WhenU were.  The Playboy and 1-800 Contacts 
cases are in direct conflict with Lockheed Martin; the only reason the courts did not 
acknowledge that conflict is their failure to recognize that contributory rather than direct 
trademark infringement was at issue in the case. 
 
 3. Policy Concerns With Expanded Liability 
                                                 
119   194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999). 
120   Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949, 966 (C.D. Cal. 
1997).   
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Just because the doctrines of trademark use and contributory infringement have 
historically limited trademark liability doesn’t mean the law necessarily should remain 
that way.  It is reasonable to reevaluate their policy basis in the new environment of the 
Internet.  But far from justifying expanded trademark rights, the characteristics of the 
Internet provide a strong policy basis for maintaining those historic limits. 
Application of contributory trademark infringement may not be appropriate at all 
to Internet intermediaries such as search engines.  Limiting liability for contributory 
infringement – both offline and online – helps lower consumer search costs by ensuring 
that intermediaries who provide information or search services are not chilled from doing 
so by the risk of trademark liability.  The search costs rationale is clearest in the case of 
an Internet search engine.  Holding search engines liable for giving consumers what they 
are looking for – content targeted in response to their query – would be perverse in a 
legal system devoted to helping consumers conduct efficient searches.  It might also 
interfere with the development of efficient search algorithms, as search engines rank-
order responses not by what consumers consider most relevant but in accordance with 
trademark owner demands.121  Other intermediaries also help reduce search costs by 
providing consumers with advertisements or information designed with the consumer’s 
interests in mind.   
Limiting liability may be appropriate for another reason as well – to avoid undue 
chilling of unquestionably legitimate behavior by intermediaries.  If we are apply 
                                                 
121   Eric Goldman expresses this fear.  See Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy, supra 
note __, at [draft at 4].  Goldman would create a safe harbor for search engines.  Id. at 
[draft at 80-86].  See also Rita Weeks, Trademarking the Sun and Moon? Why Google 
Should Not Be Held Liable For Trademark Infringement Based on Their Sale of Keyword 
Ads (working paper 2003). 
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contributory infringement doctrine to intermediaries, the contributory infringer’s liability 
will depend on facts that it cannot control and may not even reasonably be able to 
determine.  Under the threat of contributory liability for initial interest confusion, a 
magazine publisher or a billboard owner – or the seller of Internet advertising space – 
would need to pre-screen the content of the ads, compare the content to the location of 
the ads, and make a judgment call as to whether or not consumers might be likely to be 
confused by the juxtaposition.122  If there might be confusion, these intermediaries would 
then have to make a series of further determinations:  
• was the use truthful comparative advertising, or instead false or 
misleading;  
• was the use a protected nominative use, a judgment that at least in the 
Ninth Circuit requires deciding whether the use of the mark by the 
advertiser was necessary;123   
• was the use a fair use of a descriptive mark; is the mark in question in fact 
generic;  
                                                 
122   Even the 1-800 Contacts court did not go so far as to hold that any pop-up 
advertisement would infringe on the plaintiff’s trademark.  Rather, it based its ruling on 
the content of the ads posted by WhenU’s customers, something over which WhenU has 
little or no control. 2003 WL  22999270. 
123   New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 
1992).  In Playboy v. Netscape, 354 F.3d 1020, __ (9th Cir. 2004), the court rejected the 
nominative use defense out of hand because the advertiser did not need to use the term 
“Playboy.”  But for other uses, such as the one the same court approved in Playboy Ents. 
v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002), the use of the term would be necessary.  So 
intermediaries would have to make a judgment about whether a court would conclude 
that under the circumstances of a particular case the use of a mark was reasonably 
necessary. 
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• has the advertiser included a disclaimer, and if so is the disclaimer likely 
to be effective;124 and 
• most problematic, what is the advertiser’s intent in writing the copy.125   
An intermediary will be subject to trademark liability if it gets any of these judgments 
wrong, though publishers and perhaps search engines may be able to argue that the 
remedies against them are limited to injunctive relief.126  Indeed, under Playboy and 1-
800 Contacts the intermediary may be found to have acted in bad faith.127  It may be 
reasonable to require the advertisers themselves to bear this burden; they are familiar 
with the content of the ads, and they are the ones who stand to benefit from any confusion 
they create.  It seems unrealistic to expect intermediaries to have either the knowledge or 
the skill to make these decisions well.  Because the Playboy court ignored the distinction 
                                                 
124     In Playboy v. Netscape, the court strongly suggested that appropriate disclaimers 
would solve the problem altogether.  But that still leaves factual issues unresolved.  
Google, for example, refers to its advertisements as “Sponsored Links” to distinguish 
them from ordinary search results, and also sets them off to the right side.  Is this 
sufficient to dispel any initial-interest confusion?  The answer may depend on consumer 
surveys, but it may also depend on the content of the ad, something over which 
intermediaries traditionally have (and probably should have) little control.   
125   Playboy is quick to infer intent to deceive from the asserted fact of initial interest 
confusion itself.  Because the court confused direct and contributory infringement, it 
focused on Netscape’s intent rather than the advertiser’s, but in a true contributory 
infringement case it would be the advertiser’s intent that would matter in the likelihood of 
confusion analysis, though proof of Netscape’s intent would also be required.  See 4 J. 
Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition §25:18, at 25-37.  How a 
contributory infringer is to discern the advertiser’s intent in order to learn how it bears on 
the confusion analysis is not clear. 
126   15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(B) (limiting remedies against publishers of “electronic 
communications” whose liability is for printing another’s advertisement).   
127     Playboy v. Netscape, 354 F.3d at 1029; 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 2003 WL 22999270.  
This is important because it may entitle the plaintiff to damages; section 1114(2)(B) only 
applies to “innocent violators.” 
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between direct and contributory infringers, it imposed these burdens not on the logical 
party – the advertiser – but on the intermediary. 
The situation is even worse for Internet search engines.  Magazine publishers and 
billboard owners can at least be expected to see the advertisements they run before the 
public does.  It is possible, therefore, that they could vet those ads for trademark 
compliance and appropriate disclaimers, though it is far from clear that society should 
impose such a burden on them.128  Such a requirement seems even more out of place in 
the fast moving world of Internet search technology.  Keyword-based purchases of ads at 
both Google and Yahoo! operate on a pay-per-click basis; what ads actually appear in 
response to which search results depends in part on the willingness of advertisers to pay, 
and (at least at Google) in part on how successful the ad is in attracting attention.129  The 
ads change regularly, and so do the search queries; it would make little sense to require 
some central authority at an Internet search engine to read ads in advance and approve or 
disapprove their content.  Unlike a magazine or billboard that may change once a month 
                                                 
128   Imposing such a burden on those who sell advertising space also raises significant 
free speech concerns.  Many trademark cases involve challenges to core political speech.  
See, e.g., American Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682 (S.D. Ohio 2002) 
(suit by trademark owner against parody run by political candidate); Mastercard Int’l v. 
Nader 2000 Primary Committee, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 2004 WL 434404 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
8, 2004) (same). We don’t want to put billboard owners in the position of having to 
decide whether John Kerry’s attack on George Bush is likely to cause initial interest 
confusion because it has too many pictures of Bush in it. And even if making that call 
seems easy – Hagan and Nader won their cases, and it seems obvious they deserved to – 
we don’t want to give trademark owners a tool to try to chill political speech. 
129   Yahoo!, unlike Google, runs its ads in the search results list itself, rather than in 
separate boxes on the side of the page.  This approach may raise concerns under unfair 
competition laws, since people may wrongly assume that a Yahoo! ad is in fact a 
legitimate search result.  See http://news.com.com/2100-1024?3-5235529.html (noting 
that British regulators have challenged Yahoo!’s practice as not clearly identifying paid 
ads).  But under the 1-800 Contacts opinion even clearly differentiated banner or sidebar 
ads are vulnerable to trademark challenge. 
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and be produced well in advance, an Internet search results page is constructed on the fly 
in an automated process that takes only a small fraction of a second.  Asking Internet 
searchers to wait a few weeks – or even a few days – while a lawyer evaluates the context 
of their query simply isn’t realistic.130   
Nor will that evaluation effectively shield a search engine from liability.  There is 
no global list of trademarks.  Even searching the registers of hundreds of companies will 
provide only partial protection, since the United States and some other countries provide 
common law trademark protection to unregistered marks.  Search engines can’t wait to be 
notified of infringement; in at least one case a search engine has been held liable for 
damages based on permitting an advertiser to use a keyword when it was never even 
notified of the claimed infringement.131  Nor can they find a safe harbor in limiting 
keywords to descriptive or generic terms; Google has already been enjoined in France 
from permitting the use of the keywords “travel market” and “flight market,” and has 
been sued in the U.S. over the keywords “American blind” and “American wallpaper.”132 
                                                 
130   It is possible that a court would deny injunctive relief in such a case under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1114(2)(C), which provides that injunctive relief against trademark infringement by a 
publisher is unavailable if the effect of the injunction “would delay the transmission of 
such electronic communication after the regular time for such delivery or transmission . . 
. due to the method by which . . . transmission of such electronic communication is 
customarily conducted in accordance with sound business practice.”  The alternative is to 
prohibit all ads unless they have been vetted in advance.  Doing so would require 
compelling search engines to give primacy to lawyers in their business models, would 
delay the inclusion of both ads and content in search results, and would make it harder, 
not easier, for consumers to find reliable information about goods and services. 
131   Luteciel, supra note __.  By contrast, in Nemetschek the German court held that a 
search engine could not be liable without prior notice of the infringement.  This may 
relieve the burden on the search engine to some extent, but would still require it to review 
and block keywords whenever it was notified of a claim of infringement. 
132   Luteciel, supra note __ (the French language terms “bourse des vols” and “bourse 
des voyages”); Google Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 
2003. 
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Further, even a cautious policy of affirmatively weeding out anything that might 
conceivably be a trademark won’t solve the contributory initial interest confusion 
problem for Internet search engines.  Search engines sell targeted advertising using a 
process called “broad matching.”  Under the broad matching system, an advertiser may 
select an ad to run on the keyword “car.”  That ad will appear not only if a user searches 
for the exact term “car,” but also if they use a hybrid query like “Toyota car,” or “Renault 
Le Car,” or “Car and Driver.”  Even the Playboy court would presumably see nothing 
wrong with selling an ad based on the keyword “car.”  But because so many trademarks 
include descriptive or generic terms, and because search queries may mix trademarks and 
generic terms, it is far from a simple matter to determine when an ad might show up in a 
context to which a trademark owner might object.  It certainly can’t be done in an 
automated fashion, and even if lawyers are in charge of reviewing each keyword buy they 
won’t be able to anticipate the wide range of potential searches in which the search 
algorithm might find the keyword relevant.  The effect of the Playboy and 1-800 
Contacts decisions will ripple well beyond obvious cases of the use of a trademark, to 
cover seemingly innocuous keyword searches.133 
While there is some risk that consumers might be temporarily confused by 
information that purports to be relevant but is not, the doctrine of initial interest 
confusion can likely take care of that problem by permitting suit against the advertiser or 
site providing this misleading information.  Buying ad space based on a keyword isn’t 
                                                 
133   See Google Inc. v. American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 2003 
(declaratory judgment action over the propriety of selling ads based on the keywords 
“blind” and “wallpaper” that may run in a search for “American blind” or “American 
wallpaper”); Luteciel, supra (enjoining any use that would cause ads to appear when a 
user searches for the French terms for “flight market” and “ “travel market,” including 
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trademark use, but running an ad that misleadingly uses a trademark surely is.  Even if 
the advertiser manages to mislead without making a trademark use, other doctrines such 
as false advertising may prevent such conduct.134  And in the final analysis, even if there 
is some unremedied confusion as a result of the doctrine, the doctrine of trademark use is 
one in which trademark law operates to set rather than to respond to norms.  The doctrine 
is not captive to changing notions of consumer confusion; rather, it is designed to be a 
bulwark against unreasonable expansion of trademark law.  Expanding liability to include 
intermediaries that connect the consumer with the advertiser is neither necessary nor 
wise. 
 The Playboy case itself may be an exception to the last statement, because 
Netscape allegedly required advertisers to use the keywords in question.135  But if that is 
true, Netscape could be liable under traditional principles of inducement because it 
actually controlled the use ultimately made by the advertisers, assuming (as the court also 
found) that the advertisements ultimately confused consumers.  The Ninth Circuit’s result 
should be confined to its facts. There was no need for the court to extend either the 
doctrine of trademark use or of contributory infringement to initial interest confusion 
based on keywords.136   
                                                                                                                                                 
the use of such generic keywords as “flight,” “travel,” and “market.” 
134   Some commentators have suggested that reliance on false advertising may be 
preferable to invocation of trademark law.  See Goldman, supra note __, at [draft at 49, 
65, 72]; O’Rourke, Metatagging, supra note __, at __. 
135   Playboy, 354 F.3d at __.   
136   A more difficult case is presented by Google’s “keyword suggestion tool,” an 
automated feature which returns a list of suggested keywords to advertisers based on the 
text and context of the ad itself.  The keyword suggestion tool may suggest the use of 
trademarks as keywords, a fact which at least at first glance makes Google look more like 
Netscape.  In fact, however, Google’s keyword suggestion tool is driven by an 
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B. Initial Interest Confusion and its Expansion Online 
In the previous section, we discussed two related “gatekeeper” doctrines that 
should preclude liability for Internet intermediaries such as search engines, directory 
services, and sellers of advertising space.  It is less clear that the advertisers themselves 
will be protected by these doctrines, however.  If an advertiser’s use of an Internet 
keyword is held to be a trademark use, the question then becomes whether the advertiser 
is likely to confuse consumers by placing its ad in proximity to a trademark owner’s Web 
page.  Phrased in this way, the theory of confusion seems rather silly.  Offline, companies 
target their ads to be relevant to the content they support all the time.  Beer companies 
and competing sports events advertise at football stadiums and on TV broadcasts of 
football games because they believe consumers of those events will be interested in their 
products.  Advertisers target the purchasers of particular magazines by putting very 
different ads in Architectural Digest than in Glamour.  Companies place ads on particular 
pages of the New York Times with specific reference to the content that is likely to 
attract particular readers – business ads in the business section, entertainment events in 
the arts section, even ads for advertising services in the weekly section devoted to 
marketing.  Intellectual property law firms run ads in special “intellectual property” 
                                                                                                                                                 
algorithmic analysis of other user searches.  So if the tool suggests the use of a mark in 
connection with an ad, it is because consumers consider the mark relevant given the 
content of the ad.  That relevancy is something that the law should promote, given its 
focus on search costs.  See Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy, supra note __, at __ 
(suggesting that relevancy should be factored into a likelihood of confusion analysis).  
One way it might do so is through the doctrine of nominative use, but only if that doctrine 
is not read so narrowly that it requires necessity rather than merely relevancy.  See 
Weeks, supra note __ (suggesting that Google should be protected under the doctrine of 
nominative use).  Playboy’s narrow construction of the doctrine may render it of little 
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issues of legal periodicals.  In each case, they are maximizing the chance that their ad will 
be in direct proximity to a story or event involving a competitor.  But no one thinks these 
targeted uses are infringing, because we understand that consumers can distinguish in 
their minds between ads and content.  No one thinks the subject of an article sponsors or 
endorses the ad on the facing page.  That’s just not the way the world works.137 
What is different online?  One difference is that we’ve gotten much better at 
targeting ads.  Early advertising-supported Internet business models failed because 
advertisers had a metric – the “click-through rate” – to see how many viewers were 
actually interested in their ads, and the answers were disappointing.  Google and Yahoo! 
make significant money from advertising precisely because they are giving viewers ads 
that interest them; the result is good for consumers and good for advertisers but might be 
unsettling to the owner of a Web page from whose attention a consumer is distracted by 
an interesting ad.  This isn’t necessarily evidence of confusion, however; it may reflect 
consumers finding what they are looking for in an ad rather than in a search result.  If so, 
a law based on reducing consumer search costs should not be concerned. 
There is a second difference online, however – not a difference of fact but one of 
law.  That difference is the growth of the initial interest confusion doctrine. 
 
 1. The Origins of Initial Interest Confusion 
                                                                                                                                                 
benefit to Internet search engines. 
137   To be sure, in deciding questions of consumer confusion trademark law is reactive 
rather than proactive.  Whether there is confusion depends on what consumers think; if 
consumer expectations change so that they believe all ads are sponsored by the subject of 
stories or shows with which they appear, confusion doctrine will change to accommodate 
that change in expectations.  Thus, unlike the trademark use and contributory 
infringement doctrines, trademark law does not serve a norm entrepreneurial function 
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The doctrine now known as initial interest confusion had its genesis in a set of 
cases in which unscrupulous competitors sought to divert sales away from trademark 
owners by increasing consumer search costs.  In the paradigm case, Grotrian, Helfferich, 
Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, Inc.,138 the defendant used the mark 
“Grotrian-Steinweg” to sell pianos.  When the makers of the famous Steinway pianos 
sued for trademark infringement, the defendants argued that there could be no 
infringement because no customers would actually purchase a Grotrian-Steinweg in the 
mistaken belief that it was a Steinway.  The court found the absence of point-of-sale 
confusion irrelevant:  
We decline to hold … that actual or potential confusion at the time 
of purchase necessarily must be demonstrated to establish 
trademark infringement under the circumstances of this case.  The 
issue here is not the possibility that a purchaser would buy a 
Grotrian-Steinweg thinking it was actually a Steinway or that 
Grotrian had some connection with Steinway and Sons.  The harm 
to Steinway, rather, is the likelihood that a consumer, hearing the 
“Grotrian-Steinweg” name and thinking it had some connection 
with “Steinway,” would consider it on that basis.  The “Grotrian-
Steinweg” name would therefore attract potential customers based 
on the reputation built up by Steinway in this country for many 
years.139 
 
Confusion, in other words, actually diverted consumer attention to a product other than 
the one they were seeking, and having reached that product, some consumers may decide 
to give up their quest for the original.  Steinway reflects a logical extension of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
when it comes to the likelihood of confusion doctrine. 
138 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975). 
139 Id. at 1342; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d 
Cir. 1987).  While Mobil discusses initial interest confusion, and is often cited as the 
origin of the doctrine, the actual facts of the case involved sales of wholesale oil under 
the name Pegasus Petroleum, without the use of Mobil’s pegasus logo or anything like it, 
and therefore provide a rather weak case for applying the doctrine.   
Internet Search Costs – Dogan & Lemley  DRAFT 
 52 
traditional “likelihood of confusion” analysis of trademark law, fully consistent with the 
search costs rationale.  When confusion diverts customers to a competitor of the 
trademark holder and switching costs keep them there,140 uncertainty enters the 
trademark-product connection, which ultimately increases consumer search costs.   
Initial interest confusion as originally conceived, therefore, reflected not a new 
doctrine, but a simple recognition that competition-distorting confusion can occur at 
times other than the point of sale.  In the pre-Internet cases relying on the theory, 
moreover, the defendant had branded its product with a mark confusingly similar to the 
plaintiff’s, and had no comparative advertising or other pro-informational justification for 
its choice of mark.  Given the net harm to consumers, these cases justified judicial 
relief.141   
This elegant rationale, however, does not translate readily into the online context, 
in which switching costs are minimal, confusion is frequently speculative, and many 
defendants have a persuasive argument that their use brings a benefit to consumers.  A 
number of courts in Internet cases have nevertheless both invoked and expanded the 
notion that capturing initial interest can form the basis for a trademark infringement 
claim.   
                                                 
140 In this context, switching costs consist of the inconvenience of re-initiating a search 
for the product originally sought.   
141  See generally Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376 (7th Cir. 1996) (“the 
Lanham Act forbids a competitor from luring potential customers away from a producer 
by initially passing off its goods as those of the producer’s, even if confusion as to the 
source of goods is dispelled by the time any sales are consummated”); Forum Corp. of 
North Amer. v. Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 442 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1990); Koppers Co., Inc. 
v. Krupp-Koppers, 517 F. Supp. 836 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth 
Corp., 1992 WL 436279, at *24 (initial interest confusion “offers an opportunity for sale 
not otherwise available by enabling the defendant to interest prospective customers by 
confusion with the plaintiff’s product”). 
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In Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Video,142 the Ninth Circuit 
adopted a theory of “initial interest confusion” to prevent a party from using its 
competitors’ trademarks in the metatags of its website.  In Brookfield, defendant West 
Coast Video had registered Brookfield’s MOVIE BUFF mark as a domain name for its 
own movie search website, and had included MOVIEBUFF and related terms in 
metatags.143  The court found the domain name confusing under a straightforward 
likelihood of confusion analysis,144 but acknowledged that if West Coast were operating 
under a different domain name, “it is difficult to say that a consumer is likely to be 
confused about whose site he has reached or to think that Brookfield somehow sponsors 
West Coast’s web site.”145  The court nonetheless enjoined the metatag use, reasoning 
that West Coast had no right to use Brookfield’s mark to divert customers to its 
competing site:   
Although there is no source confusion in the sense that consumers know 
they are patronizing West Coast rather than Brookfield, there is 
nevertheless initial interest confusion in the sense that, by using 
‘moviebuff.com’ or ‘MovieBuff’ to divert people looking for ‘MovieBuff’ 
to its web site, West Coast improperly benefits from the goodwill that 
Brookfield developed in its mark.146 
 
Brookfield takes the initial interest confusion rationale in a novel and dangerous 
direction that disregards its confusion-based origins, defies core trademark doctrine, and 
thwarts the normative goals of trademark law.  As a doctrinal matter, the Ninth Circuit 
overlooked the fact that Steinway and other early cases finding pre-sale confusion had 
                                                 
142 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). 
143 Id. at 1061-62 (analyzing claims based on use of mark in metatags). 
144 Id. at  1055-61. 
145 Id. at 1062. 
146 Id. (emphasis added). 
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good reason to believe that customers would actually be confused by the defendant’s 
public use of a mark resembling the plaintiff’s.  In Steinway, for example, after warning 
that “each trademark infringement case is to some extent sui generis,” the Second Circuit 
found infringement in light of the strength of the Steinway mark, the direct competition 
between the parties, substantial evidence of actual confusion, and the defendant’s intent 
to free ride on Steinway’s reputation.147  Brookfield, in contrast, appeared to presume that 
confusion would result from the use of a trademark in metatags, without examining any 
evidence of how the metatags affected actual search results or whether any single 
consumer was ever actually misled.   
Beyond its poor fit with Steinway, by suggesting that a trademark holder could 
sue based on any use of a mark that might “divert” customers to a competitor, the Ninth 
Circuit ignores the legions of cases that have allowed competitors to use marks in just 
that way.148  Normatively, the Brookfield decision undermines the pro-consumer, pro-
information goals of trademark law by allowing trademark holders to impede 
competitors’ efforts to draw attention to their comparable products.  It is ironic that the 
court does so in the name of promoting precisely those goals.  
 Despite the Ninth Circuit’s broad language in Brookfield, most courts that 
followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead initially applied the initial interest confusion doctrine in 
narrow cases involving direct competitors who appeared to be attempting a “bait and 
switch” – i.e., an attempted conversion of customers only after they had unwittingly 
reached the competitor’s site.  Further, many of those cases involved efforts to confuse 
                                                 
147 523 F.2d at 1342. 
148   See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text (discussing these permissible uses). 
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that extended beyond the initial decision to visit a Web site.  In Planned Parenthood v. 
Bucci149 and Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky,150 for example, consumers reaching the site were 
falsely led to believe that the site was authorized by the trademark owner, and only 
gradually came to realize their mistake as they kept reading.  In this limited context – in 
which the competitor diverts customers through the combination of initial confusion and 
switching costs – these decisions find support in the search cost rationale of trademark 
law.  Like Steinway, the courts did not need a new cause of action to enjoin the 
defendants’ use of the marks in these cases; each involved either a deceptive, labeling-
type use of the trademark or otherwise misleading content in the website.151   
More recently, however, courts have extended the initial interest confusion 
doctrine to correspond to the broader reading of Brookfield, in which real confusion is not 
required.  In Promatec Industries, Inc. v. Equitrac Corp.,152 for example, the Seventh 
Circuit upheld an injunction against a service company’s use in metatags of the name of a 
product for which it offers maintenance and repair services.153  The court found a 
probability of initial interest confusion without considering whether consumers were 
actually confused, and without giving any weight to the service company’s legitimate 
interest in describing its products.154 In PETA v. Doughney,155 the court found initial 
                                                 
149   42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
150   993 F. Supp. 282 (D.N.J. 1998). 
151   Indeed, traditional principles of false advertising under section 43(a) might well be 
sufficient to enjoin these uses. 
152 Promatec Industries, Inc. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002). 
153 Id. at 810.  Compare Trans Union LLC v. Credit Research, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 
(N.D. Ill. 2001) (allowing use of trademark in metatags when plaintiff was affiliated with 
defendant and offered products derived from its database). 
154 Compare Bahari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
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interest confusion based on the use of the domain name “peta.org” to link to a site 
entitled “People Eating Tasty Animals,” a parody of the “People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals” Web page that visitors were presumably trying to reach.  Once 
visitors reached the page, there is no way they could have been confused given the very 
different title and the obviously parodic message of the page.  Nonetheless, the court 
found the instant of confusion before visitors saw the content of the Web page to be 
actionable.  In 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com,156 the court held that the use of a 
mark to trigger pop-up ads could result in actionable initial interest confusion.  Rejecting 
the defendant’s argument that consumers knew that the pop-up ad’s sponsors were 
unaffiliated with the trademark holder for which they searched, the court found such lack 
of confusion irrelevant:  
The harm to Plaintiff from initial interest confusion lies not in the loss of 
Internet users who are unknowingly whisked away from Plaintiff’s 
website; instead, harm to the Plaintiffs from initial interest confusion lies 
in the possibility that, through the use of pop-up advertisements Defendant 
… ‘would gain crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal.’157 
 
For the court, the real concern was that permitting WhenU.com to run pop-up ads keyed 
to a trademark “allow[ed] Vision Direct to profit from the goodwill” of that mark.158   
Most recently, in Playboy v. Netscape,159 the Ninth Circuit concluded that initial 
interest confusion could result from the placement of adult entertainment ads next to 
Playboy-related search results.  Playboy involved a challenge to Netscape’s practice of 
                                                                                                                                                 
155   263 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2001). 
156 2003 WL 22999270 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2003). 
157 Id. at *18 (emphasis added).  
158   Id. at __. 
159   354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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selling keywords to its advertisers, for use in generating banner ads.  Netscape required 
all adult entertainment services that advertised with it to include “Playboy” and related 
marks as search terms that, if entered by the user, would generate the advertiser’s banner 
ad.160  According to the court, Playboy “introduced evidence that the adult-oriented 
banner ads displayed on [Netscape’s] search results pages are often graphic in nature and 
are confusingly labeled or not labeled at all.”161  Playboy claimed that users would be 
confused by the juxtaposition of Playboy as a search term and the unlabeled ads.162 
In reversing summary judgment for the defendants, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Playboy could well succeed in proving that the unlabeled advertisements confused 
consumers, and that Netscape was legally responsible for creating such confusion.  
Admittedly, the Ninth Circuit relied upon survey evidence that suggested that many 
computer users actually believed that a relationship existed between Playboy and banner 
advertisers generated by the Playboy keyword.163  Yet the court’s decision to extent 
trademark law to banner advertisements that did not themselves reveal the mark to the 
user represented a further extension of trademark law. 
 
 2. Initial Interest Confusion May Constitute Evidence of 
Likelihood of Confusion or Deception, but Should Not Provide a 
Distinct Cause of Action 
                                                 
160 Id. at 1023. 
161 Id.  
162 Id. (“Playboy claimed that Because banner advertisements appear immediately after 
users type in PEI's marks, PEI asserts that users are likely to be confused regarding the 
sponsorship of un-labeled banner advertisements.”). 
163 Id. at 1026-27.  There are indications the survey in this case was seriously flawed, 
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 The changes to initial interest confusion doctrine discussed in the previous section 
violate both the letter and the spirit of trademark law by unmooring it from its search 
costs rationale.164  To the extent that advertisers use deception to misdirect consumers to 
their products – whether through use of confusingly similar trademarks, by “trick[ing]” 
consumers into reaching the wrong site,165 or through other forms of misleading 
advertising – they are hindering information flow and should be enjoined.  But the fact 
that an advertiser used a keyword to reach a consumer with non-confusing information 
that was of interest to that consumer cannot itself be “confusion,” whether of initial 
interest or any other variety.  It may be a diversion of consumer attention, but if the 
consumer is not confused that diversion is simply not illegal.  The presentation of viable 
alternatives or the truthful description of a competitor’s capabilities do not distort the 
market; to the contrary, this information contributes to a robust and fully informed 
market.  
 Much of the current problem has resulted from misuse of the “initial interest 
confusion” concept.  In the trademark context, the concept refers to a type of pre-sale 
                                                                                                                                                 
however.  See Goldman, supra note __, at __ (making this point). 
164   As Judge Learned Hand warned, “we are nearly sure to go astray in [trademark law] 
as soon as we lose sight of the underlying principle that the wrong involved is diverting 
trade from the first user by misleading customers who mean to deal with him.”  S.C. 
Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 116 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1940). 
165 The Seventh Circuit appeared at first to require bait-and-switch misrepresentations as 
an element of initial interest confusion.  AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 
F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2002); Dorr-Oliver Inc. v. Fluid-Quip Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 
1996).  But see Promatec Industries, Inc. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002).  
Cf. Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 3d 309, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (concluding that 
actionable initial interest confusion is limited to cases in which “the defendant was using 
the plaintiff’s mark to trick Internet users into visiting defendant’s website, believing 
either that they were visiting plaintiff’s website or that the defendant’s website was 
sponsored by plaintiff”). 
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confusion that diverts customers to a product other than the one they were seeking in 
circumstances in which it is costly to reverse course.  The diversion, to constitute 
trademark infringement, must result from the consumer’s belief that the trademark owner 
is sponsoring the ad page.  Generally this results from some visible use of the plaintiff’s 
mark.  Where the advertisement or other item that attracts the user’s attention does not 
contain the trademarked term or allusions to the trademark at all, courts should be 
extremely skeptical of claims of initial interest confusion.166   
 It is possible that in some circumstances the content of an advertisement or 
website may contain an implied falsehood, particularly when paired with a trademark-
based keyword search.  Suppose, for example, I type “Red Sox” as my search term, and 
the search engine generates an advertisement that says, “We have the tickets you want.”  
If I click on the advertisement in the hope that I will find Red Sox tickets, I may well be 
disappointed, sometimes only after wasting time searching the site.  While the advertiser 
has misled me, though, it has done so through the misleading content in its ad in the 
context of the user’s search, rather than through its use of the keyword alone.  The 
                                                 
166  Some “hidden” uses such as metatags will be actionable on this theory because they 
helped to bring about some visible presentation of the mark.  In Niton Corp. v. Radiation 
Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D. Mass. 1998), for example, the 
defendant directly copied the meta-language in plaintiff’s website, including the 
plaintiff’s trademark.  When an employee of plaintiff Niton performed an Internet search 
using the phrase “home page of Niton Corporation,” the defendant’s website turned up in 
the search results, along with the description “The Home Page of Niton Corporation, 
makers of the finest lead, radon, and multi-element detectors.”  Id. at 104.  Such a visible 
use of the Niton mark presents a classic case of likelihood of pre-sale confusion, because 
consumers viewing this search result would understandably assume that the link would 
lead them to the plaintiff. 
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appropriate cause of action in these circumstances may be a false advertising claim under 
§ 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act rather than a claim for trademark infringement.167   
In other cases, however, consumers’ attention is attracted to ads not through 
deceit but by giving the consumer information she wanted or at least might be interested 
in – precisely the sort of reduction in search costs that trademark law is supposed to 
encourage.168  This includes a number of cases in which the ads include the trademarked 
term itself.  If the advertiser has a legitimate reason to use the trademark – to engage in 
comparative advertising, to criticize or parody the trademark owner, to advertise used or 
reconditioned trademarked goods for sale or a willingness to service those goods, or to 
                                                 
167  The Lanham Act allows a false advertising claim against any person who, “in 
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, 
or geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial 
activities . . . .”  43 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1)(B).  The provision thus has two significant 
requirements:  that the representation occur in commercial advertising or promotion, and 
that it contain “false or misleading descriptions or false or misleading representations of 
fact made about one’s own or another’s goods or services.”  S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. 
Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).  See Fashion Boutique 
of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., 314 F.3d 48, 56-58 (2d Cir. 2002) (interpreting 
“advertising or promotion” language to apply only to commercial speech disseminated to 
the relevant public and designed to influence purchasing decisions).  
 To qualify as “false or misleading” under the Lanham Act’s false advertising 
provision, an advertisement must either be “literally false as a factual matter,” or contain 
information that is “literally … true or ambiguous but … implicitly convey[s] a false 
impression,” misleads, or deceives.  United Indus. Corp. v. Clorox Co., 140 F.3d 1175, 
1180 (8th Cir. 1998).  Implied falsehoods are actionable only if the plaintiff presents proof 
that consumers were actually deceived by the advertisement at issue.  Johnson & Johnson 
Vision Care, Inc. v. 1-800-Contacts, Inc., 299 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 2002).  Such an 
actual deception requirement would impose some rigor on the Internet cases, and force 
courts to confront the question of whether various Internet advertising devices actually 
mislead consumers, or instead add new informational resources. 
168   See Playboy Ents. v. Netscape Comms., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, 
J., concurring) (making this point). 
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publish stories about the brand or its owner, for example – the use of the term is 
legitimate and should not be considered confusing.169 
The courts in the 1-800 Contacts and Playboy cases erred by finding initial 
interest confusion merely because the ads in question “might divert potential customers 
from Plaintiff” on the basis of the proximity in space and subject matter of the 
advertisements, absent any proof of actual confusion.170  Trademark infringement 
requires more than diversion – it requires confusion.171  A court should not conclude that 
every use of trademarks in metatags or keywords does this.  Particularly as technology 
advances, courts should consider whether the use, in context, is more likely to confuse, 
on the one hand, or to add to the wealth of information that the consumer might think 
important, on the other.  In making this decision, courts should consider whether the 
defendant was legitimately attempting, in a non-confusing and non-diluting way, to 
                                                 
169   For this reason, Google’s new trademark policy for the U.S. and Canada, which 
permit the purchase of ad space based on a trademarked keyword but not the use of the 
trademarked term in the ad itself, see http://www.google.com/tm_complaint.html, is too 
favorable to trademark owners.  It would forbid a number of ads that the advertiser has a 
legal right to run and which would help consumers find what they are looking for.  
Google has presumably adopted this policy as a compromise because of the many suits 
and threats of suit against it by trademark owners.  But the fact that Google will block ads 
that are unquestionably legal is evidence of the in terrorem effect the expansion of 
trademark liability is having. 
170   1-800 Contacts, 2003 WL 22999270.  The language appears in two separate places in 
district court’s opinion.  See id. at __, __.  Cf. Promatek Indus., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 
300 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding trademark infringement on a theory of “goodwill 
misappropriation” without applying the multi-factor likelihood of confusion test). 
171   See J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition §10:72 (“one 
cannot dispense with the carefully constructed requirements for trademark protection by 
blithely claiming that defendant ‘misappropriated’ some symbol of plaintiff.”). 
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capture viewers’ attention, in the same way that vendors have traditionally done in 
placing like products next to one another on the grocery shelf.172 
 Some commentators have argued that courts should take technological reality into 
account and deny infringement claims based on use of marks in metatags altogether, 
because metatags simply allow competitors to present choices, not necessarily to 
confuse.173  We would not go that far, because we think there are limited circumstances 
                                                 
172 Cf. Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 3d 309, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding fair use of 
trademark in metatags of critical website, when the use “is the only way [defendant] can 
get his message to the public.  … A broad rule prohibiting the use of ‘Bahari Interiors’ in 
the metatags of websites not sponsored by Bihari would effectively foreclose all 
discourse and comment about Bahari interiors, including fair comment”).  While 
comment about trademark holders is an important value to promote, so is the ability of 
competitors to get customers’ attention.   
173 See, e.g., David M. Klein & Daniel C. Glazer, Reconsidering Initial Interest 
Confusion on the Internet, 93 Trademark Rep. 1035, 1061 (2003) (“Any ‘diversion’ of 
the consumer’s interest does not necessarily result from the consumer being misled; 
rather, it results from the consumer’s informed choice in selecting from a group of 
hyperlinks to websites.”); id. at 1061-62 (“Although metatags allow consumers to 
consider listed websites in close proximity, there is no more representation made to 
consumers of affiliation or sponsorship than in the context of a telephone book’s yellow 
pages.”); Yelena Dunaevsky, Don’t Confuse Metatags With Initial Interest Confusion, 29 
Fordham Urb. L.J. 1349 (2002); Julie A. Rajser, Misunderstanding the Internet: How 
Courts Are Overprotecting Trademarks Used in Metatags, 2001 L. Rev. Mich. St. U. 
Det. Col. L. 427.  See also Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark 
Law (working paper 2004) (arguing that initial interest confusion is a bad doctrine that 
leads to pernicious consequences online more generally).  For a prescient discussion of 
the problems metatags would pose for Internet trademark law, see Maureen A. O’Rourke, 
Defining the Limits of Free Riding in Cyberspace: Trademark Liability for Metatagging, 
33 Gonz. L. Rev. 277 (1997).   
 Under this approach, “cyberstuffing” – i.e., repeating a mark in metatags solely to 
gain prominence in a search result – would not be prohibited.  This might be a problem – 
stuffing metatags with irrelevant information may actually increase consumer search 
costs, and some courts have prohibited it.  See SNA, Inc. v. Array, 51 F. Supp. 2d 554, 
562-63 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding that repetitious use of competitor’s mark in website 
metatags, with intent to harm the competitor, constituted “a bad faith intent to confuse 
internet users” rather than a good faith attempt to index the contents of the site).  But as 
Eric Goldman observes, search engines exist in a competitive market and have a strong 
incentive to provide their users with the most relevant search results, weeding out 
algorithms that can be gamed and responding to efforts to divert consumer attention in 
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in which the use of hidden content can deceive consumers and increase their search costs.  
But those are exceptional cases, and there is no basis for assuming that any effort to 
attract consumer attention is itself illegal.  In part because the costs of switching Web 
sites is so minimal, and in part because modern consumers have a realistic sense of the 
plethora of results they can get from searches – some highly relevant, some not – they 
arguably have greater patience with obtaining some red herrings.174  While trademark 
holders may complain that those red herrings are exactly what they want to avoid because 
of the risk that the consumer might be diverted to them, trademark law has never 
empowered trademark holders to prevent customers from being attracted by truthful 
information rather than being deceived by false information.  Most consumers would 
probably prefer more comprehensive information to a world in which the trademark 
owner controls what they can see, at least as long as they can be protected against 
deception.175 
 Further, if courts create a world in which trademark owners can control what ads 
appear alongside Web pages or search result, they may increase consumer search costs 
beyond the level of those costs offline.  In the physical world, mere proximity of goods or 
advertisements has never been thought to be illegal.  Generic drug manufacturers can 
market their product in part by ensuring that it appears on the pharmacy shelf next to its 
                                                                                                                                                 
ways that turn consumers off.  Goldman, supra note __, at __.  Indeed, just this form of 
technology competition may have rendered the metatag cases irrelevant: Google, the 
primary search engine today, does not use metatag data in determining the relevance of a 
search result. 
174   Eric Goldman reports studies showing that Internet searchers will spend quite a bit of 
time investigating a topic before giving up.  Goldman, supra note __, at __. 
175 See Klein & Glazer, supra note __, at 1063 (“consumers arguably benefit from a 
wider variety of choices in their purchasing decisions when multiple websites are listed in 
the results of a search engine inquiry”). 
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brand-name equivalent.  Gas stations can compete by staking out adjacent street corners.  
But there is no similar notion of proximity online.  You can’t see the Web site “next 
door.”176  The only way to create such proximity is to permit Internet intermediaries like 
search engines to offer people links to competitive goods that they might enjoy.   
There is a related problem – the problem of coddling consumers and thereby 
changing their expectations.177  If we forbid intermediaries from providing such 
comparative information, relegating them to pointing to official sites, we may create a 
self-fulfilling prophecy.  Right now, consumers understand that search engines return hits 
based on relevance, and not based on ownership.  But if the law mandates that only 
official sites can take advantage of keyword trademarks, consumers may come to believe 
that any search result must have some sort of affiliation with the trademark owner.  If the 
law causes this belief, it might then have to permit suits against advertisers or Web sites 
whose pages come up in a search result list,178 since otherwise consumers will be 
confused.  The law will have created the very confusion it then seeks to remedy.179  And 
in the process, it will have rendered search engines much less valuable as tools for 
                                                 
176   See Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 521, 536 (2003) 
(making this point). 
177   For a discussion of this problem in consumer confusion analysis more generally, as 
the law has taken more and more account of ignorant and credulous consumers, see 
Jessica Litman, Breakfast With Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 
Yale L.J. 1717, 1722-23 (1999). 
178   In our experience, even now search engines receive complaints from trademark 
owners every day demanding that when their marks are searched, the results be “clean”  -
- scrubbed of relevant Web sites not officially sanctioned by the trademark owner.   
179   Something similar has arguably happened with merchandising of logos.  Fifty years 
ago, no one would have assumed that any T-shirt bearing the name of a sports team must 
have been licensed by the team.  But because the law began to require such licensing, 
arguably today that is exactly what people think.  If so, the law may be bound to enforce 
that belief, even though it was overly expansive court decisions that created the confusion 
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consumers to find product information.  The early promise of the Internet as a 
marketplace utopia in which consumers are empowered and fully informed will be well 
and truly dashed. 
The foregoing leads us to conclude that initial interest confusion is not properly 
viewed as a separate cause of action at all.180  By recognizing initial interest confusion as 
a separate claim, courts have shifted the emphasis of trademark suits away from the 
question of whether a use confuses to whether it attracts initial interest; as recent cases 
demonstrate, this shift in emphasis threatens to write the confusion requirement out of the 
Lanham Act altogether.  True instances of initial interest confusion may affect consumer 
search costs, and so may provide evidence of harm under traditional principles of 
trademark law.  Further, “bait and switch” advertising may be independently actionable 
under the Lanham Act.  But thinking of initial interest confusion as a separate category is 
a mistake, because it leads courts to jettison the limitations and defenses that have long 
kept trademark law on the proper path of minimizing consumer search costs. 
 
3. Initial Interest Confusion Requires Competitive Proximity 
Between the Parties 
 There is a second problem with the judicial expansion of initial interest confusion.  
Diverting use of trademarks is even plausibly a problem only in two contexts:  first, as in 
the paradigm initial interest confusion cases, when the parties to the suit are competitors, 
                                                                                                                                                 
in the first place.  See Lemley, Common Sense, supra note __, at __. 
180   The First Circuit appears to take this approach, though it has not addressed the 
question recently.  See Astra Pharm. Prods. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 
1207 (1st Cir. 1983); The Beacon Mutual Ins. Co. v. OneBeacon Ins. Group, 2003 WL 
22699644 (D.R.I. 2003).  Compare EMC Corp. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 59 F. Supp. 2d 
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and the combination of confusion and switching costs may divert would-be customers to 
the competitor’s product;181 and second, when diversion to a non-competitor imposes 
sufficient search costs on the consumer that the source-identifying value of the trademark 
will inevitably suffer.  Only the first of these types of diversion even arguably qualifies as 
traditional trademark infringement – i.e., the use of a mark to create a perceived 
connection between competing products, and to convert customers based on that 
perceived connection.  As a result, the Third Circuit held in Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. 
Check Point Software Technologies, Inc., that initial interest confusion requires proof that 
the parties are direct competitors.182   
 The second form of potential harm from diversion is not infringement-based at 
all, but a dilution-like theory that the communicative power of a mark may suffer if 
consumers cannot count on the mark to reach the trademark holder.183  But dilution 
claims, while broader in some sense, are available only in a narrow range of cases 
involving famous marks and uses that cause actual harm to the distinctiveness of the 
trademark.184  From a search costs perspective, the narrow scope of dilution makes 
perfect sense:  as a general matter, non-competitors have little incentive to utilize 
                                                                                                                                                 
147 (D. Mass. 1999). 
181   See, e.g., Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, Inc., 
523 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1975); Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Ent. Corp., 174 
F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); .   
182   269 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2001).  See also Chatam Int’l v. Bodum, Inc., 157 F. Supp. 2d 
549 (E.D. Pa. 2001), aff’d 40 Fed. Appx. 685 (3d Cir. 2002). 
183   Cf. Panavision Intern’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326-27 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(finding that, by registering the trademark holder’s mark as a domain name, cybersquatter 
had diluted the value of the trademark, because potential customers would feel frustrated 
by the inability to locate the trademark holder at the expected address, and might give up 
their search altogether). 
184    See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); Victoria’s Secret, Inc. v. Moseley, 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
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unrelated marks to call attention to their products or services; and even when a mark’s 
fame and cachet make such a strategy appealing, the non-competitor’s use will not 
necessarily prevent customers from continuing to seek out the trademark holder or make 
them think less of the trademark holder’s mark.  Occasionally, a non-competitor might 
divert consumers in a way that could frustrate their ability or willingness to reach the 
trademark holder by, for example, “mousetrapping”185 them at a site unrelated to the 
trademark holder.  Such situations, however, are rare, and should be evaluated under the 
stricter requirements of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. 
For more run-of-the-mill trademark infringement cases, the search costs rationale 
suggests that pre-sale confusion should support a claim only when the parties compete in 
a relevant market, such that confusion could divert consumers from the trademark holder 
to the imitator.  Direct competitors are the ones most likely to benefit from temporarily 
diverting consumer attention.  Non-competitors presumably won’t distract customers 
from their purchase – a driver induced to exit the highway by a sign for a hamburger 
restaurant won’t be satisfied with a movie rental store instead.  And whether traditional or 
initial interest confusion is at issue, it should be of concern to the law only if it materially 
affects ultimate purchasing decisions.186 
Further, expanding the doctrine of initial interest confusion beyond direct 
competition, as the courts implicitly do by applying it to search engines or providers of 
                                                 
185    “Mousetrapping” is “a technique that forces a user to remain on a specific Web site 
by not allowing the user to leave the site.”  Webopedia, definition of “mousetrap,” at 
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/m/mousetrapping.html (last visited April 29, 2004). 
186   This is the standard Lisa Sharrock suggests is consistent with the “conservative 
approaches” of the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, and we think it is the right one.  
Lisa M. Sharrock, Realigning the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine With the Lanham 
Act, 25 Whittier L. Rev. 53, 54-55 (2003). 
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pop-up ad service, leads to unreasonable results.  All sorts of legitimate uses of a 
trademark rely on a party’s ability to temporarily attract the attention of a consumer by 
referring to that trademark.  Companies who want to sell complementary goods need to 
target their ads to the purchasers of the complement, running airline specials to Anaheim 
in conjunction with searches for Disneyland, for instance.  And it is legal for them to do 
so. Moviemakers who wish to poke fun at that much-maligned potted meat, Spam, must 
use the Spam mark to make their point, and it is legal for them to do so.187  Songwriters 
who wish to make fun of Barbie must use the Barbie mark to attract listeners’ attention, 
and it is legal for them to do so.188  Artists who wish to make statements about Barbie 
must use the doll itself to make their point, and it is legal for them to do so.189  
Newspapers who wish to publish stories or run contests about a band must use the name 
of the band to convey their point, and it is legal for them to do so.190   
These uses are legal because the use of the mark to draw consumer attention in 
fact reduces consumer search costs, since the object of the attention is related to the mark 
in question.  Yet each of these uses also has the potential to confuse consumers for a 
time, making them think of the trademark holder’s good.  The law permits these uses 
because it thinks the value to consumers of being able to find parodies, satires, 
evaluations and commentaries outweighs any difficulty occasioned by the fact that more 
                                                 
187   Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996).   
188   Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002).   
189   Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, --- F.3d ----, 2003 WL 23018285 
(Fed. Cir. Dec. 29, 2003).   
190   New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 
1992).  See also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that 
Ginger Rogers could not sustain a trademark claim against the movie Ginger and Fred on 
the basis that it falsely suggested that the movie was about her). 
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than one person may use the term “Barbie.”  Construing initial interest confusion to be 
limited to circumstances of direct competition or dilution is the only way to render it 
consistent with these viable legal doctrines.   
One cannot, then, draw a general conclusion that the purchase advertising space 
based on the presence of a trademarked keyword in a user search is necessarily likely to 
confuse consumers.  Only a factual analysis of the text of the ad, the nature of the site and 
the reasons for using the mark, and the costs of finding what the consumer was actually 
looking for can support a finding of consumer confusion. 
 As an aside, this more traditional reading of initial interest confusion should 
suffice to protect search engines and suppliers of Web services from liability for direct 
infringement even if the courts find that such intermediaries are engaged in trademark 
use.  1-800 Contacts and WhenU are not competitors.  1-800 Contacts sells contact 
lenses, and WhenU provides Internet marketing services.  Similarly, Playboy and Excite 
aren’t competitors.  Playboy sells pornography, while Excite provides Internet search 
results.  The plaintiffs in these cases might have a claim for direct initial-interest 
confusion against other contact lens companies or other pornographers that place their 
ads with these intermediaries, but not against the intermediaries themselves.191  
 
III. Turning the Tide 
                                                 
191   In Playboy, the situation was arguably more complicated because Netscape allegedly 
required advertisers to purchase a group of keywords that included the terms “Playboy” 
and “Playmate.”  Playboy, 354 F.3d at __.  But Netscape itself wasn’t running ads that 
confused consumers, or selling products in competition with Playboy, so its liability for 
selecting the keywords in question should be addressed under principles of contributory 
rather than direct infringement. 
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 The problems we have identified come about because the courts in the Internet 
cases we have discussed appear willing to stretch or ignore traditional doctrine because of 
their equitable concerns about unjust enrichment.  This may be a particular problem on 
the Internet, because the novelty of the medium convinces courts and commentators that 
the issues that arise there are new ones with no obvious analogue in the offline world.  
Sometimes that is true; cybersquatting, for instance, fits uneasily within traditional 
trademark law, and courts spent some time stretching that law before Congress and 
ICANN stepped in with laws and regulations designed to deal with the problem 
directly.192  But in the case of Internet keywords, the apparent novelty of the question has 
served to distract courts from the application of well-established rules of trademark law, 
and has allowed them to give free rein to well-intentioned but fundamentally misguided 
instincts about ownership and unjust enrichment, instincts that are based in conceptions 
of property and not the quite different policy moorings of trademark law.   
 The result is a problem whose solution is both simpler and more difficult than one 
sees in a typical law review article.  We are not saying the law needs changing; it doesn’t.  
The law itself is just fine, and can handle Internet keywords without substantial 
modification.  What must change is that the courts must remember to apply that law.  At 
one level this is easy enough to do; we don’t need to draft a statute, or propose a new 
multifactor test, or anything of the sort, in order to solve the problems we have discussed 
in this paper.  At another level, our “proposal” may be harder to implement precisely 
                                                 
192   Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d); ICANN, 
Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, http://www.icann.org/udrp/udrp.htm.  
On the stretching of traditional trademark law to capture cybersqsuatters, see, e.g., 
Lemley, Common Sense, supra note __, at 1701-03.  For a contrary argument that the 
ACPA was unnecessary, see Suzanna Sherry, Haste Makes Waste: Congress and the 
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because it doesn’t take the form of new law.  Courts must be mindful of long-standing 
legal rules, and even more so of the fundamental normative goal that underlies those rules 
– the reduction of consumer search costs.  By focusing on this goal, courts may find 
themselves more able to resist the seductive allure of the unjust enrichment claim.  Our 
hope in this article is to remind courts and commentators of the equities on the other side 
– the reasons we have limiting doctrines in trademark law and the importance of applying 
them uniformly.  Only with the animating principles of trademark law firmly in mind can 
courts hope to get the law right in the new environment of the Internet. 
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